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THE RIGHT TO VOLUNTARY, COMPENSATED,
THERAPEUTIC WORK AS PART OF THE
RIGHT TO TREATMENT: A NEW THEORY
IN THE AFTERMATH OF SOUDER
Michael L. Perlin*
It is for the clothing, and for the food, and for the shelter, by
these to sustain their lives, that they work. Into this work and need,
their minds, their spirits, and their strength are so steadily and intensely drawn that during such time as they are not at work, life
exists for them scarcely more clearly or in more variance and seizure
and appetite than it does for the more simply organized among the
animals, and for the plants.

James Agee 1

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the attention of lawyers, psychologists, and
psychiatrists has been turned to the plight of residents in institutions
for the mentally handicapped who have been required to perform
productive labor for the benefit of the institution without adequate
compensation. 2 As it has become apparent that a significant number
of institutional residents3 have spent an appreciable amount of their
time performing such labor, 4 and as the potentiality for abuse has
become manifest,5 the contention has been made that compulsory,
* A.B., Rutgers University; J.D., Columbia University Law School. The author is the
Director of the Division of Mental Health Advocacy of New Jersey's Department of the
Public Advocate. The views, opinions, and analysis expressed herein are solely those of
the author and do not necessarily reflect the position or attitude of the Department.
1 J. AGEE & W. EVANS, LET Us Now PRAISE FAMOUS MEN 289 (Ballantine Books
ed. 1966).
2 For a general overview of this problem see Friedman, The Mentally Handicapped
Citizen and Institutional Labor, 87 HARV. L. REV. 567 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Friedman I]; Friedman, Thirteenth Amendment and Statutory Rights Concerning Work
in Mental Institutions, in 2 MENTAL HEALTH LAW PROJECT, PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED 637 (B. Ennis & P. Friedman
eds. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Friedman I]. See also A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH
AND LAW: SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 109-17 (1975).
3 Unless otherwise specified, the term "resident" will include both patients at institutions for the mentally ill and residents at institutions or "state schools" for the mentally retarded.
4 Various studies show work force percentages ranging between approximately 16
and 25 percent of the resident population. See Friedman I, supra note 2, at 568.
5 See generally Bartlett, Institutional Peonage: Our Exploitation of Mental Patients,
214 ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1964, at 116; Friedman I, supra note 2, at 567-68. For
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noncompensated work programs-labeled "institutional peonage ' 6
-may be prohibited by the thirteenth amendment, 7 a patient's constitutional right to treatment, 8 and the minimum-wage provisions of
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). 9
individual accounts of abuse see Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129, 132 (2d Cir. 1966)
(resident of a state school for mental defectives alleged that he had been "forced to
work in the . . . [s]chool's boiler house eight hours a night, six nights a week, while
working eight hours a day at assigned jobs"); B. ENNIS,

PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY

109-27 (1972) (nature and effects of an institution's systematic exploitation of a patient
over a 16-year period are recounted).
6 See Bartlett, supra note 5; Friedman II, sopra note 2, at 639.
7 See, e.g., Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129, 132 & n.3 (2d Cir. 1966) (forcing residents to perform nontherapentic work not related to personal needs solely to defray
institutional costs may violate the thirteenth amendment even if compensation is paid);
Downs v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 368 F. Supp. 454, 465 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (thirteenth amendment is applicable in mental institution context); Johnston v. Ciccone, 260
F. Supp. 553, 556 (W.D. Mo. 1966) (forced work would violate petitioner's constitutional
rights); Tyler v. Harris, 226 F. Supp. 852, 855 (W.D.\Io. 1964) (cause of action under
the thirteenth amendment stated where federal prisoner-patient claimed he was required to perform '"'a non-essential clerical function' "); (f. Parks v. Ciccone, 281 F.
Supp. 805, 811 (W.D.Mo. 1968) (nonconvicted prisoner-patient has right to be informed
"he has the right not to work"). See generally Ferleger, Loosing the Chains: In-Hospital
Civil Liberties of Mental Patients, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 447, 479-83 (1973). For an
analysis of the practicalities of thirteenth amendment litigation see Friedman I, supra
note 2, at 579-84; Friedman II, supra note 2, at 648-49.
See Weidenfeller v. Kidulis, 380 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Wis. 1974); Wyatt v. Stickney,
344 F. Supp. 373, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), enforcing 325 F. Supp. 781, 334 F.
Stpp. 1341 (.M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd sub non. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.
1974). The Weidenfeller court found plaintiffs' allegation that they were forced to perform nontherapeutic tasks for the institution equivalent to a claim that they were being
denied their constitutional right to treatment, which was "a viable theory upon which
relief might he granted." 380 F. Supp. at 451. The court in Wyatt found "nontherapeutic, uncompensated work assignments . ..dehumanizing," 344 F. Supp. at 375, and, in
ordering implementation of standards necessary to sustain a minimum level of treatment, included the stricture that all work of an institutional nature be voluntary,
therapeutic, and compensated. Id. at 381, 402.
For a discussion of how institution-maintaining labor may be attacked as undermining the right to treatment see Friedman I,su pra note 2, at 584-86.
9 The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 was amended in 1966 to expand coverage to
workers involved in "the operation of ... an institution . . .engaged in the care of...
the mentally ill or defective." Act of Sept. 23, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 201, 80 Stat.
833 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(r)(1), (s)(4) (Supp. IV, 1975)). The Act was held applicable to patient-workers in Sounder v. Brennan, 367 F. Supp. 808, 812 (D.D.C. 1973). For
a discussion of Souder see notes 10-12 & 100-02 infra and accompanying text.
Prior to Souder, the court in Wyatt v. Stickney ordered hospital administrators to
comply with FLSA minimum wage requirements. 344 F. Supp. 373, 381, 344 F. Supp.
387, 402 (M.D. Ala. 1972), enforcing 325 F. Supp. 781, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala.
1971), aff'd sub non. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). This was done
presumably because uncompensated work was "dehumanizing" and violative of the
patient's right to treatment. See 344 F. Supp. at 375; note 8 supra.
For an analysis of the practicalities of FLSA litigation see Friedman I, supra note 2,
at 571-79; Friedman I, supra note 2, at 647-48, 649.
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In Souder v. Brennan,10 a federal district court, in a class action,
held that patient-workers in state psychiatric hospitals and institutions
for the retarded are deemed to be "employees" within the coverage
of the FLSA, even if the work they do is therapeutic, "[s]o long as
the institution derives any consequential economic benefit."'" The
court ordered the defendant Secretary of Labor "to implement reasonable enforcement efforts" to apply the FLSA minimum and overtime wage provisions to residents at all state institutions for the
mentally ill and mentally retarded. 12 Subsequently, the Secretary
promulgated regulations' 3 requiring, in part, that patient-workers
whose capacities are not impaired "be paid at least the statutory minimum wage" and others be paid wages commensurate with their
productive capacities. 4
State responses to the Souder decision and to the subsequent
regulations have ranged from acquiescence and payment of wages to
abolition of all work programs.1 5 This article is directed toward those
10367 F. Supp. 808 (D.D.C. 1973).
1

1 Id. at 812-13. The class in Souder included "[a]ll patient-workers in non-Federal
institutions for the residential care of the mentally ill and mentally retarded who meet
the statutory definition of employee [within the FLSA]." Id. at 814.
12 Id. at 809-10.
1329 C.F.R. § 529.1 et seq. (1975).
14 Id.
§ 529.4. The regulations provide that subminimum wages can be paid when
authorized by certificates issued by the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of
Labor. See note 103 infra.
15 For a survey of approaches to the Souder decision and subsequent regulations
nationwide see From Peonage To Pay (pts. I-V), 5 BEHAVIOR TODAY 331, 337, 344
(1974) & 6 BEHAVIOR TODAY 351, 364 (1975); Peonage-One More Time, 6 BEHAVIOR
TODAY 372 (1975). See 26 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 190-91 (1975); cf. Moore,
The Wages of Peonage, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, March, 1975, at 17, 79.
The Behavior Today survey revealed that some states, such as New York and
Alabama, had already reduced or eliminated patient labor as a result of prior antipeonage programs or decisions. See 5 BEHAVIOR TODAY at 339, 346. But for the most
part each individual state has been forced to weigh the benefits to be derived from
patient labor against the financial realities of deflated budgets and a lack of available
resources.
In a few states, such as Massachusetts, Connecticut, North Carolina, Idaho, South
Dakota, Rhode Island, Alaska, and Kansas, the Souder decision has resulted in the simple expedient of providing the requisite pay for resident workers. Id. at 332, 338,
344-45; 6 BEHAVIOR TODAY at 353, 366. Typical of this encouraging approach are the
comments of Robert Tacey of the Connecticut mental health department, who stated
"that 'work is therapeutic and payment is good for self-concept.' " 5 BEHAVIOR TODAY
at 338.
Other states, such as Virginia, Michigan, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Indiana, Vermont, and North Dakota, have followed suit with New Jersey and have chosen to virtually eliminate all resident-performed jobs which would require compensation. Id. at
332, 338, 339, 345; 6 BEHAVIOR TODAY at 351-52, 366. In most instances, the decision
to eliminate patient labor was based solely upon the lack of adequate finances.
A third group of states is attempting to align therapeutic work programs with the
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states, particularly New Jersey, which have chosen to terminate all
work programs in state mental institutions. 6 It is urged that such a
response violates the resident's right to treatment, 1 7 right to the least
restrictive treatment setting, 18 right to freedom from harm,' 9 and
right to earn a livelihood. 20 Although some of these arguments traditionally have been used to attack the subjection of patients to labor
assignments, 2' they properly may be employed to support the proposition that the right to participate in voluntary, compensated,
therapeutic work programs is constitutionally protected. Furthermore, the rationale given for terminating Work programs-lack of
funds-will not withstand scrutiny under either the due process or
equal protection clause.22
availability of financial resources by employing various criteria to determine which
patient-held jobs should be continued. Pennsylvania has decided to employ only those
patients engaged in "'necessary" work, while Maryland intends to limit employment to
those services which are deemed "essential.' 5 BEHAVIOR TODAY at 332. Washington
plans to certify patients for labor programs "on the basis of productivity and whether or
not treatment personnel prescribe work" for any particular individual. Id. Both Tennessee and Massachusetts will continue resident work, but plan to reduce the number of
work hours. This goal will be accomplished through use of "a stepladder program, in
which patients progress in the number of hours they may work according to their needs
and competence." Moore, supra at 17.
Several states have yet to formulate any policy and are merely keeping records of
all resident work hours while one, California, nay challenge the Souder decision on the
ground that patient labor is not within the scope of the FLSA. See 5 BEHAVIOR TODAY
at 339.
16 New Jersey abolished all work programs as of December 1, 1974, because of the
state's inability to pay patient workers. See Letter from Dr. klichail Rotov, Acting Director, Division of Mental Health and Hospitals, Department of Institutions and Agencies
of N.J., to author, October 31, 1974, on file at Seton Hall Law Review. The letter states
in pertinent part:
The Department of Institutions and Agencies apparently was not successful in
obtaining additional funds to compensate patients for their work at the public
mental hospitals. Additionally, the total fiscal situation of the state is such that
all departments have been required to exercise maximum prudency and restraint. The level of expenditures on salaries is to be kept at the September 13,
1974 level. Under these circumstances no remuneration of patients for work can
be expected. All patient work will have to be discontinued by December 1,
1974.
i7 See text accompanying notes 23-83 infra.
iS See text accompanying notes 130-50 infra.
'9 See text accompanying notes 151-64 infra.
20 See text accompanying notes 165-70 infra; note 169 infra.
21 See note 8 supra. See generally!Friedman I, supra note 2, at 584-86. It has been
suggested that nontherapeutic work programs might also violate the cruel and unusual
punishment clause of the eighth amendment, implicitly a partial basis of the constitutional right to freedom from harm. See Jortberg v. United States Dept. of Labor, Civil
No. 13-113, at 10 (D. Me., April 10, 1974) (citing, inter alia, Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 271-79 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
22 See text accompanying notes 172-75 infra.
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WORK PROGRAMS AND THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT

The most crucial right infringed by the stoppage of work programs is the institutionalized mental patient's constitutional right to
treatment, of which the voluntary, therapeutic work program is an
indispensible element. The development of the constitutional right to
treatment has been heavily documented, and it is not the purpose of
this article to retrace ground thoroughly covered in prior literature."3
However, it is still necessary to review the current state of the law in
this context and to demonstrate that the existence of this right is
today virtually beyond question, having been recognized almost without exception by federal courts confronting the issue 24 and implied in
25
analogous Supreme Court decisions.
23 For a survey of recent literature regarding the right to treatment see Schwitzgebel, Implementing a Right to Effective Treatment, 1975 LAW & PSYCHOLOGY REV.
117, 117 n.1; Note, The Wyatt Case: Imnplemnentation of a Judicial Decree Ordering
Institutional Change, 84 YALE L.J. 1338, 1339 11.5 (1975).
24 Virtually every lower federal court confronting the issue has held that a constitutional right to treatment exists for those detained by the state under nonpenal statutes.
See, e.g., Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1312-15 (5th Cir. 1974) (mentally ill and
mentally retarded); Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 521-22 (5th Cir. 1974), acated and remanded on other grounds, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (mentally ill); Nelson v.
Hevne, 491 F.2d 352, 360 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974) (juveniles); Davis
v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196, 1197 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (mentally ill and mentally retarded); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 499 (D. klinn. 1974) (mentally retarded);
Stachulak v. Coughlin, 364 F. Supp. 686, 687 (N.D. I11.
1973), rev'd on other grounds,
17 CRIm. L. REP. 2462 (7th Cir. Aug. 6, 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3489 (U.S. Mar.
2, 1976) (No. 75-608) (dangerous sexual offenders); Morales v. Turman, 364 F. Supp.
166, 175 (E.D. Tex. 1973) (juvenile delinquents); Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575,
585 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (juveniles in need of supervision); Inmates of Boys' Training School
v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354, 1372 (D.R.I. 1972) (juvenile offenders). For cases which
implicitly recognize a right to treatment see sections (a)-(d) of note 55 infra.
Only two district courts have denied a right to treatment. See New York State Ass'n
for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Burnham
v. Department of Pub. Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335, 1340 (N.D. Ga. 1972), rev'd, 503 F.2d
1319 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1057 (1975). Not only has Burnham been
reversed, but the same judge who had declined to find a right to treatment in
Rockefeller, supra, and who had premised his decision instead on the existence of a
right to freedom from harm, has appeared to withdrawx from his earlier position:
Somewhat different legal rubrics have been employed in these
[institutional class action] cases-"protection from harm" in this case and "right
to treatment" and "need for care" in others. It appears that there is no bright
line separating these standards.
New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715, 719 (E.D.N.Y.
1975).
25 Although the Supreme Court has not ruled on the precise question, its decisions
dealing with the rights of mentally handicapped persons suggest that the right to treatment is of constitutional dimension, mandated by both the due process clause and the
eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
In Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), the Court stated that while a state
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The right to treatment was first articulated by Dr. Morton Birnbaum in a 1960 article in the American Bar Association Journal.26
Birnbaum, drawing upon his experience as both a doctor and a
lawyer, argued that when the state commits a person under its parens
patriae power, it must legally, morally, and ethically give that person
treatment. 2 7 Although this was hardly a radical idea, it was not judicially recognized until 1966 in Rouse v. Cameron,28 a habeas corpus
action brought by an inmate, confined following acquittal on grounds
of insanity, who maintained that the absence of treatment rendered
his confinement unconstitutional. 29 Judge Bazelon, writing for the
District of Columbia Circuit, found a statutory right to treatment, 30
but more significantly, he noted that confinement without treatment
would raise "considerable constitutional problems" under the due
process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment
and the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment.3 1 Rouse was the springboard used by subsequent courts which
found the right to treatment constitutionally mandated, 3 2 most notably, Wyatt v. Stickney,3 3 a landmark series of decisions involving
may confine involuntarily a narcotics addict for )prposes of treatment, imprisoning him
for his illness "inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id.at 665, 667. Mental illness clearly falls within the ambit of Robinson.
See McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245, 251 (1972); cf. Jackson v.
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 737 n.23 (1972). Subsequently, the Court indicated that a state
must justify confinement of an involuntarily committed mentally handicapped person
b therapeutic progress. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) (continued
commitment of mental incompetent must he justified tbyprogress toward competency); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504. 514 (1972) (allegation by indefinitely committed
sex offender that he was not receiving treatment may have raised a "substantial constitutional claim"). Hence, under the rationale of Robinson, confinement grounded
on mental illness must he accompanied by treatment, and under the rationale of
Jackson, the treatment rendered must further the state's therapeutic goal. A fortiori,
involuntary confinement of the mentall' ill must he accompanied by treatment calculated to improve the patient's condition or the confinement violates the fourteenth
amendment.
Although the Court recently avoided reaching the specific issue in O'Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), its decision in that case neither undermines the Fifth
Circuit holding, see note 64 infra and accompanying text, nor contradicts the rationale
expressed in the cases discussed above, see notes 57-58 infra.
26 Birnbaum, The Right To Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960).
27 Id.
28 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
29 Id. at 452.
30 Id. at 453-55.
a1Id. at 453. Rouse is the seminal statutory right-to-treatment case. For an analysis
of the Rouse approach see Stone, The Right to Treatient and the Medical Establishment, 2 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRBY & LAW 159, 161 (1974).

Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 492-93 (D. Minn. 1974).
33325 F. Supp. 781, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), enforced, 344 F. Supp.
32
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residents in Alabama institutions for the mentally ill and the mentally
34
retarded.
In the initial Wyatt decision, Judge Johnson held that civil patients possess
a constitutional right to receive such individual treatment as will
give each of them a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve
35
his or her mental condition.
Subsequently, he held that the mentally retarded have a similar "constitutional right to habilitation." 36 Judge Johnson found that the
Alabama state system failed to provide adequate treatment and habilitation and that this failure deprived patients of their constitutional
rights. 3 7 He specified three conditions which must be met to satisfy
constitutionally "adequate" treatment or habilitation: "(1) a humane
psychological and physical environment, (2) qualified staff in numbers
sufficient to administer adequate treatment and (3) individualized
treatment plans."3 8 The influence of Wyatt was so great that, even
before the case reached the Fifth Circuit, the opinion was relied on
by federal courts as persuasive authority for the proposition that the
39
right to treatment was of constitutional dimension.
373, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d
1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
34 The impact of Wyatt cannot be overstated. It was the first class action of its kind
in the mental health field, initiated by the preeminent Mental Health Law Project of
Washington, D.C., filed against all Alabama institutions, backed by many prestigious
amici, and brought before the prominent activist federal district judge, Frank Johnson.
For a recent article highlighting the distinguished career of Judge Johnson see Brill,
The Real Governor of Alabama, NEW YORK, April 26, 1976, at 37.
35 325 F. Supp. at 784.
36 344 F. Supp. at 390 (footnote omitted). After the original Wyatt ruling, plaintiffs
had amended their complaint to expand the class to include residents of institutions for
the mentally retarded. Judge Johnson ruled that "no viable distinction can be made
between the mentally ill and the mentally retarded," and concluded that since "the
only constitutional justification for . . . committing a mental retardate . . . is habilitation,
• . . once committed, such a person is possessed of an inviolable constitutional right to
habilitation." Id. (footnote omitted).
" 325 F. Supp. at 784. The court gave the defendants six months to raise the standard of care at state mental institutions. Id. at 785. At the subsequent hearing, the court
found that the defendants had failed to implement constitutionally minimal standards
and ordered an additional hearing for the purpose of establishing appropriate standards.
334 F. Supp. at 1343-44.
38 334 F. Supp. at 1343. At a subsequent hearing, the court adopted and ordered
implementation of standards to assure that these requirements were met. 344 F. Supp.
at 378-79 (covering state institutions for the mentally ill); id. at 394-95 (covering state
institutions for the mentally retarded).
39
See Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196, 1197 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Welsch v.
Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 495-96 (D. Minn. 1974); Stachulak v. Coughlin, 364 F. Supp.
686, 687 (N.D. I11. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 17 CRiM. L. REP. 2462 (7th Cir. Aug.
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Wyatt was joined for oral argument on appeal40 with Burnham v.
Department of Public Health,4 1 a decision denying the existence of a
constitutional right to treatment. 4z The Fifth Circuit proceeded to affirm Wyatt 4 3 and reverse Burnham, 4 holding that there is a constitutional right to treatment, 45 that adequacy of treatment is an appropriate subject for judicial review, 46 and that a class action seeking
47
remedial relief is warranted.
The Fifth Circuit based its right-to-treatment holding on Donaldson v. O'Connor,4 8 which it had decided a few months earlier. In
Donaldson, the court held that due process guarantees a right to
treatment and affirmed the award of damages against officials of a
Florida state mental institution. 49 The court based its holding on "a
two-part theory." The first part invoked the traditional due process
6, 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3489 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1976) (No. 75-608); Morales v.
Turman, 364 F. Supp. 166, 175 (E.D. Tex. 1973); Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575,
600 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
40 503 F.2d at 1314.
41 349 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ga. 1972), rev'd, 503 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 422 U.S. 1057 (1975).
42 349 F. Stpp. at 1340-41. The court also held that the issue of treatment was
nonjusticiable and that injunctive relief was precluded by the existence of an adequate
remedy at law through individual suits. Id. at 1342-43.
43 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
44 503 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir. 1974). The court reversed in a brief per curiam opinion,
citing its decisions in Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), and Wyatt
v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
45 503 F.2d at 1313-14. Finding the right to treatment constitutionally mandated,
the court dispensed with appellees' arguments that no jurisdiction existed under 28
U.S.C. § 1243(.3) (1970), see 503 F.2d at 1312 & n.7, and that the suit was barred by the
eleventh amendment, id. at 1314.
46 503 F.2d at 1314. The court stated that implementation of the right to treatment
could be accomplished through judicially manageable standards, and that court-enforced
implementation did not impermissibly invade a legislative function, since a state legislature may not "for budgetary or any other reasons . . . provide a social service in a
manner which will result in the denial of individuals' constitutional rights." Id. at
1314-15.
Lack of justiciability was also argued on appeal in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S.
563 (1975). The Supreme Court rejected the contention that adequacy of treatment was
nonjusticiable, stating that
[w]here "treatment" is the sole asserted ground for depriving a person of liberty, it is plainly unacceptable to suggest that the courts are powerless to determine whether the asserted ground is present.
Id. at 574 n.10.
47 503 F.2d at 1316. Individual suits at common law were deemed inadequate due
to the particular situation of mental patients and the need for preventive relief. Id.
48 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 422 U.S.
563 (1975).
49 493 F.2d at 510. Patient Donaldson brought his action for damages pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). 493 F.2d at 510.
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requirement that any abridgment of freedom must be justified by a
legitimate state purpose. 50 Applying this concept to the commitment of
mental patients, 5 1 the court found a constitutional right to treatment
supported, if not mandated, by the Supreme Court's holding in Jackson v. Indiana,52 that "[a]t the least, due process requires that the
nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to
the purpose for which the individual is committed.- 5 3 Thus, when
the parens patriae rationale,
the state confines an individual under
54
treatment must in fact be provided.
The second part of the theory employed by the Fifth Circuit in
Donaldson resulted in the determination that treatment must be provided as "the quid pro quo" required by due process to justify any
deprivation of liberty which lacks the traditional limitations and procedural safeguards normally accorded to one who is incarcerated by the
state. 55 Hence, even when confinement is based on a "dangerous to
50 493 F.2d at 520.
51 Id. at 521.

52 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
53 Id. at 738.
54 493 F.2d at 521.
55 Id. at 521-22. The court noted that the government's power to detain an individual is subject to three limitations:
that detention be in retribution for a specific offense; that it be limited to a
fixed term; and that it be permitted after a proceeding where fundamental procedural safeguards are observed ....
Id. at 522.
The court surveyed five procedural contexts in which attacks on the nature of nonpenal confinement had arisen and found that, in almost every situation, there must be a
quid pro quo for confinement "in circumstances where the conventional limitations of
the criminal process are inapplicable." Id. at 522-25. Treatment was found or implied as
the quid pro quo in:
'nonpenal' con(a) "habeas corpus petitions brought by citizens held under ...
finement . . . in correctional facilities for prisoners convicted of crimes," see, e.g., Benton v. Reid, 231 F.2d 780, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (confinement of those endangering public health in prison hospital would violate fifth and sixth amendments); In re Maddox,
351 Mich. 358, 370-72, 88 N.W.2d 470, 476-77 (1958) (incarceration of sexual psychopath in prison is not treatment and violates constitutional rights to trial and due process); cf. Miller v. Overholser, 206 F.2d 415, 418-19 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (confinement of
sexual psychopath in institution for the "hopeless insane" rather than in institution -for
the mentally ill who are not insane is not treatment and therefore is not authorized by
statute);
(b) holdings that persons under nonpenal confinement "must be held in places
where the conditions are actually therapeutic," see, e.g., Darnell V. Cameron, 348 F.2d
64, 67-68 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (confinement based on need for treatment requires that
treatment be afforded); Commonwealth v. Page, 339 Mass. 313, 317, 159 N.E.2d 82, 85
(1959) (when sexually dangerous person confined in prison state must show therapeutic
aspect of confinement);
(c) decisions holding "that the constitutionality of the statute is conditioned upon
the realization of the statutory promise of rehabilitative treatment," see, e.g., Sas v.
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others"-"protection of the public" rationale, treatment is constitution6
ally mandated. 5
In its subsequent review of Donaldson, the Supreme Court found
it unnecessary to rule on the existence of a constitutional right to
treatment,5 7 holding instead that involuntary custodial confinement
without treatment of a mental patient not dangerous to himself or
Maryland, 334 F.2d 506, 509 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted
sub nor. Murel v. Baltimore City Crim. Ct., 407 U.S. 355 (1972) (constitutionality under
sixth, eighth, and fourteenth amendments of act confining "defective delinquents" to be
conditioned on treatment actually provided); Davy v. Sullivan, 354 F. Supp. 1320,
1328-29 (M.D. Ala. 1973) (statute which permits transfer of sexual psychopaths to prison
cannot be constitutionally justified as remedial measure);
(d) habeas corpus petitions challenging nonpenal confinement on several grounds
including lack of treatment, see, e.g., Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 514 (1972) (allegations of lack of treatment for one indefinitely confined pursuant to state sex crimes
act may present "substantial constitutional claims"); Stachulak v. Coughlin, 364 F.
Supp. 686, 687 (N.D. I11.
1973), rev'd on other grounds, 17 CmM. L. REP. 2462 (7th Cir.
Aug. 6, 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3489 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1976) (No. 75-608) (failure to
provide treatment to one confined as a "sexually dangerous person" states cause of action);
(e) federal class actions "seeking broad forms of injunctive and declaratory relief
requiring that adequate treatment be provided in state-run facilities," see, e.g., Wyatt
v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1312-15 (5th Cir. 1974) (those confined in mental institutions have constitutional right to treatment requiring certain minimal standards be met);
Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 360 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974) (juveniles committed to state correctional institution have constitutional right to rehabilitative treatment); Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (juveniles
subject to long-term confinement as "persons in need of supervision" have constitutional right to treatment); Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354,
1367 (D.R.I. 1972) ("antirehabilitative" conditions of confinement of juvenile delinquentq fmnd to violate due process and equal protection).
56 493 F.2d at 521. In Wyatt v.Aderholt, the Fifth Circuit described its decision in

Donaldson as holding that where confinement is justified on the basis of danger to
others
treatment had to be provided as the quid pro quo society had to pay as the
price of the extra safety it derived from the denial of individuals' liberty.
503 F.2d at 1312.
5' O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573 (1975). The Court reasoned that since
the jury had found that no "treatment," as defined by the trial court, had been provided,
there was
no occasion . . . to decide whether the provision of treatment, standing alone,
can ever constitutionally justify involuntary confinement or, if it can, how much
or what kind of treatment would suffice for that purpose.
Id. at 574 n.10. The trial court had instructed the jury
"that a person who is involuntarily civilly committed to a mental hospital does
have a constitutional right to receive such treatment as will give him a realistic
opportunity to be cured or to improve his mental condition."
Id. at 570 n.6 (emphasis by the Court). Since the trial court's instructions announcing
and defining the right to treatment pertained only to those confined on the basis of
need for treatment, the issue of whether one confined on the basis of dangerousness to
self or others has a constitutional right to treatment was not presented. Id. at 570-71 n.6.
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others violated that patient's constitutional right to liberty. 58 In light of
its intervening decision in Wood v. Strickland,5 9 altering the scope of
official immunity in civil rights cases, 60 the Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration of the question of
damages. 6 1 In doing so, the Court noted that its vacation of judgment
deprived the Fifth Circuit's opinion of "precedential effect," 62 citing
United States v. Munsingwear, Inc. 63 This caveat, however, does not
erode the constitutional basis of the Fifth Circuit's opinion: A close
reading of Munsingwear indicates that the Donaldson Court's intent
was to rob the circuit court opinion of precedential effect only as it
related to further proceedings on remand with respect to damages in
the Donaldson litigation itself.64 Hence, the constitutional basis of the
-8 Id. at 575-76. The Court made clear that indefinite, involuntary custodial confinement cannot be justified solely on the basis of a determination of mental illness. Id.
at 5.75. Although this could be interpreted as implying that a "definite" period of confiner/lent or "treatment" above and beyond the level of custodial care may justify commitment, the Court indicated that even these elements will be insufficient when such
persons "are dangerous to no one and can live safely in freedom." Id.
59 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
60 In an action for damages under section 1983 brought by high school students
against school board members, the Wood Court, in a five-to-four majority opinion, held
that official immunity would not extend to acts done maliciously (a subjective good-faith
test) or to acts which the official "knew or reasonably should have known . . . would
violate the constitutional rights of [others]" (an objective good-faith test). 420 U.S. at
321-22. Justice Powell, speaking for the minority, dissented from this part of the opinion and termed the majority decision a departure from prior standards which would
"significantly enhanc[e] the possibility of personal liability." Id. at 331.
61 422 U.S. at 577 & n.12. The Court determined that the trial court in effect had
found that O'Connor deprived Donaldson of his constitutional right to liberty, and
therefore the only question to be decided by the Fifth Circuit on remand was whether,
in light of Wood v. Strickland, the trial court's failure to instruct the jury of the effect of
O'Connor's alleged reliance on state law rendered the instruction inadequate. On remand, the Fifth Circuit determined that in light of Wood v. Stricklanid the trial court's
instruction was inadequate "in defining the scope of the qualified immunity possessed
by state officials," and it remanded the case for a reconsideration of that issue. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 519 F.2d 59, 60 (5th Cir. 1975).
62 422 U.S. at 577-78 n.12. The Court stated:
Of necessity our decision vacating the judgment of the Court of Appeals
deprives that court's opinion of precedential effect, leaving this Court's opinion
and judgment as the sole law of the case. See United States v. Munsingwear,
340 U.S. 36.
Id.
6. 340 U.S. 36 (1950).
64 The issue in Munsingwear was whether a judgment on one count of a complaint,
which was precluded from review on grounds of mootness, barred litigation of the second count because of the doctrine of res judicata. Id. at 37. Justice Douglas, writing for
a unanimous Court, held that it did, but pointed out that the res judicata effect could
have been avoided by a motion to vacate judgment which, if granted, would have
"clear[ed] the path for future relitigation of the issues between the parties." Id. at 39-40
(emphasis added).
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Fifth Circuit's decision in Donaldson, reiterated in Wyatt and relied on
in Burnham, has not been undermined. Subsequently, the Supreme
Court declined an opportunity to review the Fifth Circuit's reversal of
Burnham, where, relying on Donaldson and Wyatt, the circuit court
had overturned the only federal decision which had held that no such
right to treatment existed. 65
Munsingwear has generally been cited by the federal circuit courts as authority for
vacating judgments rendered nonreviewable by mootness and remanding to the district
courts with directions to dismiss as moot. See, e.g., New Left Educ. Project v. Board of
Regents, 472 F,2d 218, 220-21 (5th Cir. 1973). The purpose of the vacation is to avoid
unfairness to the parties which might result "from the prejudicial effect of an unreviewed judgment." Id. at 221. See also Comment, Disposition of Moot Cases by the
United States Supreme Court, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 77, 83, 93 (1955).
Since 11unsingwear deals solely with mootness, it is unclear exactly what the
Donaldson Court intended by its reference to the case. However, the most reasonable
inference which may be drawn is that since Munsingiwear held that a res judicata effect
would attach in the absence of a vacation, the Court was compelled to vacate the judgment to clear the way for relitigation of certain factual issues relating to the narrow
consideration of official immunity and reliance on state law. See note 61 supra.
Although some circuits have interpreted a vacation of judgment on grounds of
mootness to rob the lower court opinion of stare decisis as well as res judicata effect, see
Boston Community Media Comm., Minority Caucus v. FCC, 509 F.2d 516, 517 (D.C.
Cir. 1975); Cabuco-Flores v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 477 F.2d 108, 112 (9th
Cir. 1973), others, even in the mootness context, have interpreted the disposition to go
no further than precluding claims of res judicata, see In re Hearings by the Committee
on Banking and Currency of the United States Senate, 245 F.2d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 1957);
Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 214 F.2d 820, 820 (3d Cir. 1954). The GranvilleSmith court stated explicitly that it was governed by a prior decision even though the
judgment in that case had been vacated on grounds of mootness by the Supreme Court.
Id. As one author has noted:
If the opinion below is officially reported, it will always remain in the volume;
even if the decision is vacated, the force of the reasoiiiig remains.
Comment, supra at 93 (footnote omitted).
The language in Donaldson appears consistent with the approach of those circuits
which consider vacation of a judgment in the mootness context to deprive a lower court
opinion of precedential value only in the res judicata, and not the stare decisis, sense.
The Court made clear that it was not deciding whether there is a constitutional right to
treatment. 422 U.S. at 573. Furthermore, the Court stated that the purpose of vacating
the judgment was solely for reconsideration of damages in light of a new immunity
standard, id. at 577-78 & n.12, and emphasized that its opinion is "the sole law of the
case," id. at 578 n.12 (emphasis added). These statements appear to support the view
that the Fifth Circuit opinion is robbed of precedential effect only as to those portions
of the opinion which might otherwise inhibit relitigation of damages because of the res
judicata effect which would attach in the absence of a vacation of judgment. Although
Chief Justice Burger, in his single concurring opinion, read the majority statement to
mean that the entire Fifth Circuit opinion is no longer precedent for the district courts
in that circuit, id. at 580, this wide-ranging result appears unwarranted, particularly in
light of the distinction between a judgment which will never be reviewed due to mootness and a judgment which, in effect, is affirmed "on other grounds" and remanded for
relitigation of damages on a narrow, unrelated point of law.
65Burnham v. Department of Pub. Health, 503 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'g 349
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In addition to the due process basis espoused by the Fifth Circuit,
the constitutional right to treatment may also be seen as resting on the
cruel and unusual punishment clause, found specifically applicable to
mental hospitals in Rozecki v. Gaughan,66 and developed in the context of suits challenging jail and prison conditions. 67 The right to
treatment may also be based on the equal protection clause on the
theory that, because involuntary civil commitment involves fundamental rights, 68 equal protection requires that the classification of the
group being civilly committed must be subject to the rigid scrutiny of
the "compelling state interest" test. 6 9 Thus, to justify the classification
and filfill the rationale for confinement, the state must provide suitable treatment. 70
Apart from the constitutional arguments, there exists in some
states-New Jersey for example-an independent statutory right to
treatment. In In re D. D.,71 a habeas corpus action brought by a
juvenile confined in the state's maximum-security psychiatric facility,
the New Jersey appellate division recognized a statutory right based

F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ga. 1972), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1057 (1975). See also note 24
supra.
66 459 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1972). The plaintiffs in Rozecki were patients confined to a
state correctional institution either pursuant to civil commitment or for observation.
They complained that by failing to provide heat in the institution, defendant administrators subjected them to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth
amendment. Id. at 7. The defendants contended that since "plaintiffs were patients
rather than 'inmates' . . . the question of punishment was not involved." Id. The court
rejected this contention, indicating that, if any distinction were to be made, cruelty
would be mole cognizable in a civil as opposed to criminal setting. Id. at 8. See also
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); note 25 supra.
67 See, e.g., Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594, 627 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 507 F.2d 333
(2d Cir. 1974) (lack of "tolerable living environment" violates detainees' rights under
eighth amendment); Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1193 (E.D. Ark. 1971) (if
conditions of pretrial detention are punitive in any way, eighth amendment will be
violated); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Stpp. 362, 372-73 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d
304 (8th Cir. 1971) ("confinement itself ... may amount to a cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Constitution where the confinement is . . . shocking to the
conscience").
" See notes 135-40 infra and accompanying text.
69 Cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). In Dunn, the Court held that since
durational residence requirements infringe fundamental rights to travel and to vote,
these requirements must be subject to "a strict equal protection test" and may be justified only by a compelling state interest. Id. at 342.
7 See generally Friedman & Halpern, The Right to Treatment, in 1 MENTAL
HEALTH LAW

PROJECT,

PRACTISING

LAW INSTITUTE,

LEGAL RIGHTS

OF THE

MEN-

273, 282 (B. Ennis & P. Friedman eds. 1973) (confinement without treatment renders classification of civilly committed mental patients irrational).
See also notes 165-68 infra and accompanying text.
71 118 N.J. Super. 1, 285 A.2d 283 (App. Div. 1971).
TALLY HANDICAPPED
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on two provisions: 72 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-7.1 which mandates that
the state "make maximum provision for the health, safety and welfare" of mental patients 73 and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-24.1 which,
prior to 1975, provided that the mentally ill "shall be entitled to
humane care and treatment.- 74 The court warned that custodial care
alone was insufficient to fulfill this mandate, adding that legislative
failure to implement required treatment would compel action by
courts "to protect the rights of persons committed to [state] public
mental institutions," 7 5 and indicating that indefinite confinement
without treatment might violate the eighth and fourteenth amendments. 76
In State v. Carter,77 the New Jersey supreme court subsequently
78
incorporated the entire In re D. D. right-to-treatment discussion,
holding that 'a patient committed after dismissal of charges on grounds
of insanity could be granted a conditional release under New Jersey
law.7 9 While noting that it was not "faced with delineating the scope
of the right to treatment," the Carter court termed the right "an affirmative obligation on behalf of the State" and noted that its existence
80
"bears on the availability of conditional release."
After Carter, the legislature revised the "humane care and
treatment" provision to read: "Every individual who is mentally ill

shall be entitled to fundamental civil rights. '"8' This provision, which
72 Id. at 7, 285 A.2d at 286-87.
73 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-7.1 (Supp. 1975-76).
74 Id. § 30:4-24.1 (Supp. 1975-76), (is amended, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-24.1 (Supp.
1976-77). The new law greatly expanded the rights of residents in state mental institutions. See note 81 infra.
75 118 N.J. Super. at 6, 285 A.2d at 286. Thi court addcd that " '!..ai.nr to provide
suitable and adequate treatment cannot he justified by lack of staff or facilities.' " Id.
(quoting from Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Rouse is the seminal statutory right-to-treatment decision. See text accompanying notes 28-32 supra.
76 118 N.J. Super. at 6, 285 A.2d at 286.
77 64 N.J. 382, 316 A.2d 449 (1974). See generally Note, Conditional Release From
Mental Institutions Made Available to Persons Confined Under Criminal Statutes, 6
SETON HALL L. REV. 128 (1974).

78 64 N.J. at 393-94, 316 A.2d at 455-56.
79 Id. at 389, 316 A.2d at 453.
80 Id. at 393, 316 A.2d at 455.
Si Law of May 7, 1975, ch. 85, § 1, [1975] N.J. SESS. L. SERV. 140, amending N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 30:4-24.1 (Supp. 1975-76) (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-24.1 (Supp.
1976-77)).
This new provision is clearly intended to remove some of the stigma borne by the
mentally ill and to accord them, as nearly as possible, the same fundamental civil rights
enjoyed by the rest of the population. The powers of the directors and staffs of mental
health facilities tinder prior law have been sharply curtailed. Under the former law, for
example, mechanical restraints could be applied to a patient if "required by his medical
needs." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-24.1 (Supp. 1975-76). The statute now provides that
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is part of a comprehensive new "Bill of Rights" for the mentally ill,
implicitly recognizes the constitutional implications of confinement,
including the state's obligation to provide treatment reasonably calculated to improve or cure the patient's mental condition. The statutory
revision has not yet been considered by the New Jersey supreme
court; however, in State v. Krol,8 2 a subsequent case concerning
83
commitment standards for those acquitted on grounds of insanity,
the court noted that any restraint imposed by a commitment order
"must . . . always be coupled with a corresponding opportunity for
care and treatment" and cited In re D. D. along with a number of
federal cases holding that the right to treatment is constitutionally
84
mandated.
Constitutionally "Adequate" Treatment
The "treatment" deemed constitutionally required has been defined by the Fifth Circuit and New Jersey courts as that "adequate"
to give institutionalized patients "a reasonable opportunity to be
cured or to improve [their] mental condition." 85 However, the dimensions of "adequate" treatment have only begun to be drawn. In a
"first things first" context, courts confronting the massive denial of
every patient has the right "[t]o be free from physical restraint and isolation," and lists
procedures which must be followed in those instances when restraints are absolutely
necessary. Id. § 30:4-24.2(d)(3) (Supp. 1976-77), amending id. § 30:4-24.2 (Supp.
1975-76). Now, for the first time, the use of excessive medication as punishment or as a
substitute for treatment is strictly forbidden, and patients have the judicially enforceable
right to refuse shock treatment, experimental research programs, sterilization and
psychosurgery. Id. §§ 30:4-24.2(d)(1), (2) (Supp. 1976-77).
Before the amendment, patients' rights could be denied if the director of the facility
felt it was medically necessary. Id. § 30:4-24.2 (Supp. 1975-76). Under the new law,
no right may be denied for more than 30 days and then only when imperative and for
good cause, and the patient, his attorney, and his guardian have been notified. Id.
§§ 30:4-24.2(g)(1)-(3) (Supp. 1976-77).
82 68 N.J. 236, 344 A.2d 289 (1975). See generally Note, Standard for Commitment
Following Acquittal by Reason of Insanity Made Uniform with That for Civil Coininitinent, 7 SETON HALL L. REx'. 412 (1976).
83

68 N.J. at 243, 344 A.2d at 29.3-94. The plaintiff' challenged the constitutionality

of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:163-3 (1971), which provided that a jury-after acquitting a

defendant on grounds of insanity-make a separate determination as to the defendant's current sanity. If his insanity was found to continue, le was to be committed to the
state psychiatric hospital.
84 68 N.J. at 262, 344 A.2d at 303 (citing, inter alia, In re D. D., 118 N.J. Super. 1, 6,
285 A.2d 283, 286 (App. Div. 1971); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 334 F. Supp.
1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), enforced, 344 F. Supp. 373, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972),
aff'd sub norn. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974)).
" Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 520 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded
on other grounds, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). See also State v. Carter, 64 N.J. 382, 393, 316
A.2d 449, 455 (1974) (citing In re D. D., 118 N.J. Super. 1, 6, 285 A.2d 283, 286 (App.
Div. 1971)).
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rights prevalent in many of those mental institutions which have been
the objects of class action litigation necessarily have focused on setting standards to govern living conditions, supervision of patients, and
basic treatment and institutional procedures. 8 6 However, neither
courts nor legislatures have yet determined the implications of "adequate" treatment as it relates to the availability of particular therapeutic programs. 87 At the least, however, it would appear that constitutionally "adequate" treatment would require the availability of those
particular therapeutic programs deemed generally essential to patients' improvement.8 8 Othenvise, therapeutic effort would be crippled to the extent that confinement would fail to satisfy, the Supreme
Court mandate "that the nature and duration of commitment bear
some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is
committed. 89 The opportunity to participate in work programs is
such an integral and essential component of therapy that abrogation of
86See, e.g., Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196, 1198-1212 (N.D. Ohio 1974);
Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 379-86, 344 F. Supp. 387, 395-407 (M.D. Ala.
1972), enforcing 325 F. Supp. 781, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd sub norn.
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
For two views on what constitutes adequate treatment see Birnbaum, A Rationale
for the Right, 57 GEO. L.J. 752, 753 (1969) (adequacy of treatment "should be objectively based upon a consideration of the institution as a whole and not subjectively
premised upon the individual therapy received"); Halpern, A Practicing Lawyer Views
the Right to Treatment, 57 GEO. L.J. 782, 792 (1969) (adequacy of treatment must be
determined by "an inquiry into the adequacy of the individual's treatment"). See also
Developments in the Law: Civil Commitment of the Mentally I11, 87 HARV. L. REV.
1190, 1333-44 (1974) (judicial standards for both institutional and individual treatment
program s).
For a discussion of how both court-imposed "quantitative" requirements (regarding
environment and staff) and couit-ini;posed "qualitative" standards (regarding individual
patient rights) fail to provide "adequate" treatment see Hoffman & Dunn, Beyond
Rouse and Wyatt: An Adminstrative-Lauc Model for Expanding and Inplementing the
Mental Patient's Right to Treatment, 61 VA. L. REV. 297, 303-10 (1975). The authors
state that effective implementation of a patient's right to treatment can best be accomplished through an administrative model composed of (1) a rule-making board; (2) legal
aid service to both inform, counsel, and represent patients in all adjudicatory proceedings; (3) treatment evaluators to conduct hearings following patient complaints; and (4)
mental-health judges who would have jurisdiction over commitments and appeals from
decisions made by the treatment evaluators. Id. at 315-18.
87 The need for "comparative studies of alternative therapies" has been often noted.
Wexler, Token and Taboo: Behavior Modification, Token Economies, and the Law, 61
CALIF. L. REV. 81, 109 & n.152 (1973). According to Professor Wexler, unless such
studies "are performed soon, the law will be unable to incorporate the results in developing a sensible package of patient rights." Id. at 109 (footnote omitted).
88 See Schwitzgebel, Right to Treatment for the Mentally Disabled: The Need for
Realistic Standards and Objective Criteria,8 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LiB. L. REV. 513
(1973). The author "suggests that a reasonable standard of treatment is effectiveness."
Thus, treatment is adequate if "it accomplishes its purpose." Id. at 520.
81 Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
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all such programs results in treatment inadequate to achieve the
major purposes of confinement-improvement of one's mental condition and, when possible, reintegration into the community.
Before documenting the therapeutic importance of work programs, it should be emphasized that while the affirmative right to
these programs has yet to be ruled upon, 90 the issue of work within
mental institutions has been the subject of extensive comment, litigation, and, more recently, government regulation. As a result, if and
when work is made available to mental patients, that work must be
voluntary, 9 1 therapeutic, 92 and compensated when "the institution
90 A class action for injunctive and declaratory relief filed in the United States District Court for the District of Maine alleges that termination of patient employment at
Pineland Center, an institution for the mentally retarded, violates plaintiffs' constitutional right to habilitation. First Amended Complaint at 14, Wuori v. Rosse, Civil No.
75-80 (D. Me., filed Oct. 1, 1975). The plaintiff class is defined as
residents who want to work, are able to work, and who are not otherwise involved in a full-time program calculated to meet their needs for habilitation or
whose habilitation needs can best be met by working.
Id.
91 Voluntariness is required by the thirteenth amendment prohibition against involuntary servitude and by the patient's constitutional right to treatment. See notes
97-99 infra and accompanying text. It can also be argued that voluntariness is required
by the right to refuse treatment, which has been found to rise to constitutional dimensions in cases involving subjection of patients to drugs. See Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d
1136, 1139-40 (8th Cir. 1973) (nonconsensual subjection of patients to vomit-inducing
drug as part of an "aversive" conditioning program violates eighth amendment); Mackey
v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877, 878 (9th Cir. 1973) (nonconsensual use of drug causing
temporary paralysis raises "serious constitutional questions respecting cruel and unusual punishment or impermissible tinkering with the mental processes").
In an analogous setting, a federal district court has held that segregated confinement of prisoners for sixteen months in response to their refusal to participate in prison
work constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Adams v. Carlson, 368 F. Supp. 1050,
1053 (E.D. II. 1973).
It seems apparent that the right to refuse treatment can extend to the right to refuse
to participate in an involuntary work program. See generally Friedman, Legal Regulation of Applied Behavior Analysis in Mental Institutions and Prisons, 17 ARIZ. L. REV.
39 (1975) (right to treatment encompasses right to refuse treatment since the former is
limited by the right to privacy, the eighth amendment, and the due process clause);
Schwartz, In the Name of Treatment: Autonomy, Civil Commitment, and the Right to
Refuse Treatment, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 808 (1975) (forced treatment of nonconsensual patient violates the right to privacy, the due process clause, and the first, fourth,
and eighth amendments); Wexler, Behavior Modification and Other Behavior Change
Procedures: The Emerging Law and the Proposed Florida Guidelines, 11 CRIM. L.
BULL. 600 (1975) (right to treatment limited by personal automony, necessitating informed consent, competence, and least restrictive treatment).
92 The requirement that work be therapeutic is demanded both by case law, see
note 8 supra, and by the realities of institutional life. As one British hospital superintendent has bluntly stated:
The economy of a mental hospital is based on "patient-labour". Patients as
patients are not thought of when this term is used (that would make the speaker
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derives any consequential economic benefit. ''g

These requirements

are to some extent directed at ending the abuse termed "institutional
peonage," i.e., compelling hospital inmates to perform tasks without
compensation solely for the benefit of the institution.
Cases have proceeded on grounds that such labor violates the
thirteenth amendment, 9 4 the patient's right to treatment, 95 and the
uncomfortable), but only the commodity they provide-labour. That patients
should do a little domestic work, to foster a feeling of community and to teach
them how to care for their homes, is reasonable. What is unreasonable is the
extent to which the hospital is dependent on their work. In fact, without it the
hospital could not run and the mental-hospital service would collapse.
Bickford, Economic Value of the Psynchiatric Inpatient, THE LANCET, March 30, 1963, at
714 (emphasis added).
The necessity for distinguishing between therapeutic and nontherapeutic labor has
been recognized in AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC AsS'N, STANDARDS FOR PSYCHIATRIC
FACILITIES, Standard 32 (1969) ("a clear distinction betweeen therapeutic and nontherapeutic work assignments is essential") and by other mental health authorities. See,
e.g., Safier & Barnum, Patient Rehabilitation Through Hospital Work Under Fair Labor
Standards, 26 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCIIAT1-RY' 299, 302 (1975) (noting the continuing
importance of developing programs "to make work therapy or paid hospital-work assignments available as a rehabilitative, rather than an institutionalizing, medium");
Oudenne, Resident Labor: A Practical Solution in New Jersey State Institutions, 12
MENTAL RETARDATION, Oct. 1974, at 17 (examining the therapeutic, practical, and potentially deleterious effects of institutional labor).
It has been suggested by Paul Friedman, a leading patients' rights advocate, that for
a work program to be characterized as "therapeutic," nine standards should apply:
(1) Work assignments should be made after a careful prior physical and
mental examination and diagnosis;

(2) The work assignment should be dictated by the resident's personal
hahilitation or training needs and not the institution's maintenance needs;
(3) The actual work assignment should 1e made only by a physician or
other qualified professionals;
(4) %V'rk assig..nents
iddmd1be part of and related to a larger integrated
treatment programn;
(5) The resident's work assignment must 1e entered into the resident's
record;
(6) The resident's work assignment should be carefully supervised by a
qualified staff member who is aware of the way in shich the specific work assignment fits into the larger treatment plan;

(7) The resident's alleged work theraps program should be regularly reviewed so that appropriate adjustments can be made;
(8) The resident should perform his w%7oik
voluntarily and with appropriate
understanding of its purposes; and
(9) The resident should he fairly compensated for his labor.
Friedman 1I, supra note 2, at 652. Unless the standards suggested by Friedman are
present, and unless the distinction urged by the American Psychiatric Association is
maintained, it is likely that the programs will remain predominately little more than
what the British superintendent aptly described as the economic underpinning of the
hospital system. See Bickford, supra, at 714.
93 Souder v. Brennan, 367 F. Supp. 808, 813 (D.D.C. 1973).
94 See note 7 supra.
95 See note 8 supra.
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terms of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 96 It has been held, for example, that the thirteenth amendment will be violated when even a
97
compensated patient is compelled to perform nontherapeutic labor,
thus implying that that amendment requires that work performed be
either therapeutic or voluntary. 9 8 Considerations compelled by a
patient's right to treatment have resulted in the further requirement
that all work of an institutional nature be both therapeutic and
voluntary. 99 Finally, as a result of Souder v. Brennan, patients must
be compensated to the extent that their labor economically benefits
the institution, regardless of whether such labor is therapeutic. 100 The
Souder court stated that "[lt]o hold otherwise would be to make
therapy the sole justification for thousands of positions as dishwashers, kitchen helpers, messengers, and the like."'' 1 The court
ordered the Secretary of Labor to implement and enforce the application of FLSA minimum-wage and overtime compensation provisions
"to patient-workers at non-Federal institutions for the residential
care
1
2
of the mentally ill and/or mentally retarded."'
In compliance with
the order, the Secretary promulgated regulations requiring that nonimpaired patient workers "be paid at least the statutory minimum
wage," and others be paid wages commensurate with their productive
9

C See note 9 supra.
97 Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129, 132 n.3 (2d Cir. 1966).
98 Id. at 131. The Second Circuit in Jobson assumed that the thirteenth amendment
did not preclude states "from requiring that a lawfully committed inmate perform without compensation certain chores . . . if the chores are reasonably related to a therapeutic
program." Id.
The court's conclusion presumes that the state's interest in treatment is sufficient to
outweigh the thirteenth amendment prohibition against involuntary servitude. See id. at
131-32 & n.3. However, this assumption is subject to further considerations. First, it
may be argued that the state's interest in treatment does not override the thirteenth
amendment. See Friedman I, supra note 2, at 582 n.91; Right to Compensation for
Institution-MaintainingLabor Under the Thirteenth Amendment: Excerpts from Claimant's Brief in Dale v. State of New York, in 2 MENTAL HEALTH LAWV PROJECT, PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE M\IENTALLY HANDICAPPED 695 (B.
Ennis & P. Friedman eds. 1973). Second, and even more important, it may be argued
that forced institutional work programs cannot be sufficiently therapeutic to qualify as
treatment because (1) the conflict between institutional maintenance needs and individual treatment needs will inevitably impinge upon the therapeutic value of work to
the patient, see, e.g., Friedman I, supra note 2, at 569-70; and (2) involuntary institutional work is, in and of itself, often anti-therapeutic, see, e.g., Haller, Legal Challenges
to Peonage in Juvenile Institutions,-9 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 453, 461 (1975).
99 Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 381, 344 F. Supp. 387, 402 (M.D. Ala. 1972),
enforcing 325 F. Supp. 781, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt
v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). See note 8 supra.
100 367 F. Supp. at 813.
101Id. (footnote omitted).
102 Id. at 809-10.
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capacities pursuant to certificates issued by the Wage and Hour
Division. 103

While many institutions have developed work programs in conjunction with the guidelines set forth in the regulations, others have
abolished all such programs. 10 4 Ironically, then, the victory in the
battle to eliminate some of the major sources of patient-labor abuse
has resulted-through no fault of its proponents-in a total elimination of work programs in many institutions. However, if such work
programs are an essential component of such treatment as will give
patients "a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve [their]
mental condition,"105 then these programs are constitutionally man-

dated, as long as they, are compensated and voluntary.
The Therapeutic Value of Work
It is generally agreed that therapeutic work "enhances [the
patient's] self esteem as a member of a work-oriented society" since
the patient "knows that what he is doing has value."' 1 6 This is espe103 29 C.F.R. § 529.1 et seq. (1975). Certificates covering "evaluation and training,"
"individual exception," and "work activities center," may require no minimum wage
but do require pay commensurate with productivity. Id. §§ 529.4(c), (e), (f). A fourth
"group minimum wage" certificate requires that workers be paid not less than fifty percent of the federal minimum wage. Id. § 529.4(d). The power to approve subminimum
wages derives from section 14(c) of the Fair Labor Standards Act which authorizes the
granting of such certificates "'to prevent curtailment of opportunities for employment" of
handicapped persons. 29 U.S.C. § 214 (Supp. IV, 1975).
Generally, the regulations require an institution to compensate a worker whenever
an employment relationship exists. 29 C.F.R. § 529.2(d). While the existence of an employment relationship is a factual determination based on all the circumstances, the
relationshin "generallv arises" whenever patients work, except when the work is solely
personal housekeeping or related to crafts. The major criterion "is whether the wonk

performed is of any consequential economic benefit to the institution," i.e., of a type
noninstitutionalized workers normally perform within and outside of the institution. The
patient's performance capability and the therapeutic value of the work are irrelevant to
a determination of the existence of the employment relationship. Id.
114 For a survey of various state responses to the Souder decision see note 15 supra.
105 Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971), enforced, 344 F.
Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd sub ncor. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.
1974).
106 D. CLARK, SOCIAL THERAPY IN PSYCHIATRY 80-81 (1974).
The psychoanalytic roots of the work drive are deep. Freud saw "the compulsion to
work"--along with "the power of love"--as part of the "two-fold foundation" of the
"communal life of human beings." S. FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 48
(1st Am. ed. J. Strachey 1962). Erikson has posited that a person's attitude toward work
is formulated during the latency period (after early childhood but before adolescence),
during which time he "learns to win recognition by producing things." E. ERIKSON,
CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY 259 (2d ed. 1963). Hendrick has suggested that a "work prin-

ciple" governs those "functions which enable the individual to control or alter his environment," operative via an "instinct to master" which leads the individual to derive
pleasure from successful work. Hendrick, Work and the Pleasure Principle, 12
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cially so in a society such as ours in which, as the noted social
theorist Sebastian de Grazia has pointed out, "the American without
work . . . is a damned soul."' 1 0 7 It also has been noted that, "[w]ithout work, one loses one's condition of being an adult."'10 8 Conversely,
" '[p]rolonged unemployment typically leads to a deterioration of personality: passivity, apathy, anomie, listlessness, dissociation, lack of
interest and of caring.' "109
Q. 311, 311, 314-15 (1943). See also Hendrick, The Discussion of the
"Instinct to Master," 12 PSYCHOANALYTIC Q. 561 (1943).
Lantos has theorized that for an "adult the principle of working is the primary motive for any activity," and that "[a]n adult who is deprived of his work . . . loses the
essential condition of being an adult." This is so because work motivation grows out "of
the instinct of self-preservation" and because "[t]he feeling of freedom, independence
and security depends on the ability to guarantee one's existence by one's own achievements." Therefore, it is a "relief from fear," insecurity and dependence that is felt by
the productive adult. Lantos, Work and the Instincts, 24 INT'L J. PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 114,
118-19 (1943). In a later article, Dr. Lantos concluded that "pleasure is not the ultimate
motive of work. The powerful motive is self-preservation." Lantos, Metapsychological
Considerationson the Concept of Work, 33 INT'L J. PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 439, 442 (1952).
For a broad analysis of various work motivation theories see Neff, Psychoanalytic Conceptions of the Meaning of Work, 28 PSYCHIATRY 324 (1965). For a comprehensive
discussion of both the biological and historical origins of work see M. ARGYLE, THE
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF WORK 7-30 (1974) [hereinafter cited as ARGYLE].
107 S. DE GRAZlA, OF TIME, WORK, AND LEISURE 41 (1962).
' Olshansky & Unterberger, The Meaning of Work and Its Implications for the
Ex-Mental Hospital Patient, 47 MENTAL HYGIENE 139, 141 (1963) (emphasis in original). The authors analogize the ex-mental patient's reentry into society to "the adolescent and the minority group person, who is uncertain about his identity." Id. at 148.
They contend that "[j]ob satisfaction . . . is based . . . on the financial and emotional
rewards implicit in being able to function in an approved adult role." Id. (emphasis in
original). Since society fails to facilitate the necessary role transition, the patient must
fend for himself, and "[w]ork . . .constitutes a major bulwark against the tendency to
regression." Id.
The importance of work has been noted by others. Social psychologist Michael Argyle states that "[work] can be the cause of mental health or mental ill health."
ARGYLE, supra note 106, at 245. In another context, famed economist Gunnar Myrdal
termed work "the basis for self-respect and a dignified life." G. MYRDAL, CHALLENGE
TO AFFLUENCE 41 (1963). Similarly, Menninger has stated that approximately 75 per
cent "of the patients who come to psychiatrists are suffering from an incapacitating impairment of their satisfaction in work or their ability to work," and that in many cases
"it is their chief complaint." Menninger, Work as a Sublimation, 6 BULL. MENNINGER
CLINIC 170, 177 (1942). See generally Oberndorf, Psychopathology of Work, 15 BULL.
MENNINGER CLINIC 77 (1951). See also ARGYLE, supra note 106, at 246, 247 ("low job
status leads to low self-esteem which, in turn, produces low mental health") (citing Kasl
& French, The Effects of Occupational Status on Physical and Mental Health, 18 J.
SOCIAL ISSUES 67 (1962)).
Recently, a group of social psychologists labeled unemployment "America's major
mental health problem." Philadelphia Inquirer, Sept. 6, 1975, at 8-A, col. 1. According
to Dr. Hannah Levin:
"People who lose jobs and can't find work tend to feel like non-persons.
They are depressed, apathetic, disoriented and withdrawn. They feel dispossessed, helpless and often irrational. In this society, they have lost a primary
source of a sense of identity, self-esteem, status, meaning and autonomy.
PSYCHOANALYTIC
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Institutionalization itself can have a depressing effect on selfesteem by its tendency to minimize an individual's unique characteristics and to emphasize his role as "patient" and "sick person. '"110
Providing patients with meaningful work roles can be a potent tool in
avoiding the debilitating effects of institutionalization: For recently
admitted individuals, a meaningful work role "modifies the tendency
for a 'person' to erode into a 'patient' "; for the long-term or chroni' 1
cally ill, "it can serve as a pivotal force in rehabilitation. "11
In addition, in-hospital work can often be seen as the first step
on the path toward meaningful out-patient vocational rehabilitation
and as an "integral part of the therapy program. '"112 It is a mechanism
by which a "realistic evaluation of work potential" may be made, 113
and it serves as "the most culturally accepted and reality-based prov"In short, people who are unemployed usually suffer a loss of self and a
collapse of personality."
Id. cols. 1-2. See also Ochberg & Kopolox, Spin-off From a Downward Swing,
MENTAL HEALTH, Summer 1975, at 21.
109 W.

WINICK,

INDUSTRY IN THE HOSPITAL:

MENTAL REHABILITATION THROUGH

WORK 13 (1967) (quoting from B. BERELSON & G. STEINER, HUMAN BEHAVIOR 403
(1964)).
110 Schwartz, Expanding a Sheltered Workshop to Replace Nonpaying Patient Jobs,
27 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 98, 99 (1976).
"I Id. at 99-100. A study of 109 patients engaged in paid (as a consequence of
Souder) institutional tasks at four Pennsylvania institutions revealed
that 94.5 per cent of the patients enjoyed working; that 85.3 per cent felt more
respected by others when they worked; that 88.1 per cent felt a greater sense of
self-respect when they worked; and that 87.6 per cent considered work a form
of therapy. Also, 85.8 per cent endorsed the statement "I wish they had paid
patients to work before now." And 89.8 per cent endorsed the statement
"Being paid to work while I am still in the hospital is the best opportunity I've
had in a long time."
Work: The Patients' View, 27 HosP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 102 (1976).
112 AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 166 (2d
ed. S. Brakel & R. Rock 1971). See also L. LINN, A HANDBOOK OF HOSPITAL
PSYCHIATRY 86 (1955) [hereinafter cited as LINN]. For the traditional attitude towards
"work therapy" see S. DAVIES, SOCIAL CONTROL OF THE MENTALLY DEFICIENT
229-32 (1930); J. GILLIN, POVERTY AND DEPENDENCY 283-84 (1921). For historical development of various attitudes towards the treatment of the mentally ill see N. DAIN,
CONCEPTS OF INSANITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1865 (1964). Dain stated that by
the 1860's,
[m]anual labor still proved to be "the most effective of the 'moral means,' for
the promotion of a cure in the curable," and for making the incurables "more
comfortable and contented."
Id. at 118 (quoting from FRIENDS' ASYLUM FOR THE INSANE, 25th ANN. REP., 1842,
at 20; 28th ANN. REP., 1845, at 18; 32d ANN. REP., 1849, at 17-18). See also Reid, Ergotherapy in the Treatment of Mental Disorders, 171 BOSTON MED. & SURG. J. 300
(1914).
113 Adlestein & Jolly, Rights of Mental Patients to Treatment and Remunerationfor
Institutional Work: Comments by the Office of Mental Health, 39 PA. B. ASS'N Q. 548,
549 (1968).
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ing ground for testing [the patient's] new insights in interpersonal
relationships," his motivation being "greatly strengthened" where
work is "realistically tied in with his vocational objective after
release."114 The value of meaningful work programs has been underscored by forensic psychiatrist Jonas Robitscher, who has contrasted
the remarkable success of Russian work-therapy programs which are
"designed to provide meaningful work and to serve as a transition
between the hospital and the working world" with the lack of success
of traditional "occupational therapy" programs in this country which
1 15
are not so designed.
Compensation itself is seen by institutional superintendents and
administrators "both as a therapeutic tool and also as a protection for
the resident against exploitation," in that money-the universally accepted "reward"-serves to encourage responsible working habits,
eliminate the burdens of financial dependency, and reduce "the
economic incentive for institutions to exploit" patients by maintaining
them "longer than necessary."116 Conversely, the worker, without
compensation, suffers direct income loss, loss of work-related social114

Richman & Zinn, Work as a Central Focus in Therapy, 13

MENTAL HOSPITALS

603 (1962).
Most revealingly, in an article written more than twelve years ago, New Jersey's
director of the Division of Mental Retardation praised New Jersey's then-existing wage
programs for the mentally retarded, noting that such a
program provides an opportunity for gradually diminishing custodial control
and correspondingly increased freedom for selected residents. It presents
selected residents with new opportunities to experience formal employeesupervisor relationships in familiar circumstances. It offers expanded opportunities to attempt community adjustment and handling of their own earned
funds.
Kott, Wage Programsfor Mentally Retarded Residents of Public Institutions, 1 MENTAL
RETARDATION 161, 163 (1963). Cf. Berry & Lukens, Integrating Occupational Therapy
Into Other Activities in a Day Treatment Program, 26 HosP. & COMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY 569 (1975).
115 J. ROBITSCHER, PURSUIT OF AGREEMENT: PSYCHIATRY & THE LAW%'148 (1966).
According to Robitscher, the Russian programs are based on the writings of Pavlov and
Korsakoff added that
"'[s]ystematic, meaningful occupations have a beneficial influence not only on
and physical work. Help is possible if physical work corresponding to the individuals' potentialities [are] correctly applied."
Korakoff added that
"[s]ystematic, meaningful occupations have a beneficial influence not only on
those chronically ill with persistent and progressive mental debility but also on
acute patients, giving an outlet for energies that otherwise would be manifested
in destruction and anxiety."
Id. at 147 (quoting from MEDICAL WORLD NEWS, Oct. 15, 1965, at 135) (footnote omitted).
116 Friedman II, supra note 2, at 641. See also Morris, Institutionalizing the Rights
of Mental Patients: Committing the Legislature, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 957, 1014 (1974).
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legislation benefits, and the loss of "a basic sense of self respect or
dignity. "117
Not surprisingly, "[p]atients in mental hospitals are found not to
differ in this regard from their 'normal' fellows in the outside
community. '" 1 1 8 A study of patients in an occupational crafts group in
a day-care center revealed:
The matter of payment is taken quite seriously because no
single factor is more important in the total picture of rehabilitation
than to discover that one is being paid for ability rather than disability. Nothing appears to be a greater stimulus to engage in activities that reflect health instead of illness than to be paid for the
product of those activities. 119

Also, when New York hospital patients who had been involved in an
occupational therapy program were promised compensated employment upon successful completion, the knowledge that they would receive compensation "was electrifying" to them: Work which had taken
two weeks was now completed in three days"; patients "began to take
noticeable pride in their appearance and performance"; and, finally,
instead of being viewed "as 'old-timers' doomed to" lifelong confinement, they were seen "as worthwhile rehabilitation prospects. "120 Finally, in a closely monitored study of chronic schizophrenic patients
who were involved in a remunerated work program, it was found
that, while the workshop was open, 13 of the 14 working patients
showed a decrease in "idiosyncratic behavior pattern[s]," while 7 of
the 8 nonworking patients showed an increase in such behavior. The
researchers thus concluded "that, given an optimal medication proThe operation of a patient loan fund at one state psychiatric institute has been seen
as a "therapeutic tool" and as an "invaluable . . . practical unlocking device for reaching
some patients who might otherwise be inaccessible to more traditional therapeutic approaches." Williams, M1oney and the Therapeutic Process, 18 CANADA'S MENTAL
HEALTH 20, 21, 23 (1970).
17 Friedman II, supra note 2, at 642.
118 LINN, supra note 112, at 85.
1 Scoles & Fine, Aftercare and Rehabilitation in a Community Mental Health
Center, SOCIAL WORK, July 1971, at 75, 78. Friedman has noted that
[fa orced employment without compensation may engender feelings of enslavement, exploitation, or persecution, undermining constructive attitudes and the
sense of human dignity essential to therapeutic progress. Appropriate compensation for work performed by patients serves as a meaningful "reward" which
can motivate such patients to develop responsible work habits and behavior
patterns vital to their eventual reintegration into the community.
Friedman I, su pra note 2, at 569 (footnotes omitted).
120 Richman & Zinn, supra note 114, at 607. See also Safier & Barnum, supra note
92, at 302.
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gram and a suitable type of work, exposure of the individual to a
sheltered workshop is therapeutically valuable. "121
Unquestionably, compensated, voluntary work programs may be
equated with "such individual treatment as will give [patients] a
realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve [their] mental
condition,"122 and may be seen as a necessary element of due process
requiring "that the nature and duration of commitment bear some
reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is
committed.' 123 Thus, the right to treatment should be read to include the right to such therapy.
It is suggested that the right to participate in voluntary, compensated work programs is applicable to all residents of state institutions
for the mentally ill and mentally retarded, whether the state has confined them under its parens patriae power (need for treatment) or its
police power (need to protect the public). The Fifth Circuit's opinions
in Wyatt and Donaldson make clear that a constitutional right to
treatment exists regardless of the basis for confinement. 124 Similarl,
the right to therapeutic work programs must be made available not
only to those committed for treatment, but also to those committed
for society's protection as part of the "quid pro quo" owed to those
whom the state confines indefinitely without the normal procedural
125
safeguards accorded those incarcerated under criminal statutes.
The right must also be made available to the mentally retarded as
part of their constitutional right to habilitation to "enable [the resident] to cope more effectively with the demands of his own person
and of his environment and to raise the level of his physical, mental,
1 26
and social efficiency.'
121

Esser, Behavioral Changes in Working Chronic Schizophrenic Patients, 28

DISEASES OF THE NERVOUS SYSTEM 441, 445, 447 (1967).
122

Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971), enforced, 344 F.

Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd sub nora. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.
1974).
123 Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). It has been pointed out that
ineffective treatment which does not increase the likelihood of a civillycommitted patient's returning to participation in the community is not reasonably related to the ultimate goal of his commitment for treatment and violates
due process requirements.
Schwitzgebel, supra note 23, at 120-21.
124 Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1312-15 (5th Cir. 1974); Donaldson v.
O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 520-22 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
125 See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
126 Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 395 (M.D. Ala. 1972), enforcing 334 F.
Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.
1974).
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Finally, the right to voluntary, compensated, therapeutic work
must also apply to so-called "voluntary" residents.127 Voluntariness as
a status has been accurately labeled as "illusory" by at least one respected commentator,128 and the legal distinction between voluntary
and involuntary has been recognized as inadequate for purposes of
determining whether a patient is truly "willing" or "unwilling" to be
institutionalized. 129 The distinction is equally meaningless for the
purpose of classify ing those patients to whom the right to work attaches. This conclusion is inescapable whether one uses a due process
approach or whether one looks to the realities of institutional life.
WORK PROGRAMS AND TREATMENT IN THE LEAST
RESTRICTIVE SETTING

Elimination of work programs infringes not only a patient's constitutional right to treatment but also his right to be treated in the
least restrictive setting.130 Work programs constitute an important
127 Voluntary residents

are those persons who apply for admission to a mental in-

stitution without presentation to the courts for adjudication of the need for commitment.
In New Jersey, a person 18 or older may file an application for admission to a mental
institution. An adult famili member or guardian may file ao application on behalf of a
minor under 21 years of age. N.J. STAT. AN-N. § 30:4-46 (Supp. 1975-76). However, no
minor may be permanently committed without a court hearing and a judicial determina7
7
tion that commitment is necessary. See N.J.R. 4: 4- (j).
2I Herr, Civil Rights, Uncivil Asylums, and the Retarded, 43 U. CIN. L. REv. 679,
722 (1974). The author notes further that "the 'volhntarv' resident may have even fewer
opportunities for discharge than those involuntarily committed." Id. at 723.
129 E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS 131-33 & n.9 (1961). See also Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F.
Supp. 1039, 1046-47 (E.D. Pa. 1975), prob. juris, noted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3531 (U.S. \Iar. 23,
1976) (No. 75-1064) (children facing coinitne,t
are entitled to due process proteetions); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752,
756 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (noted that voluntarily admitted patients are treated no differently
than involuntarily committed patients); Horacek v. Exon, 357 F. Supp. 71, 73 (D. Neb.
1973) (plaintiffs' claiim that their voluntarily committed children were being denied
constitutional right to treatment stated a cause of action under section 1983).
130 A resident's right to the least restrictive treatment setting is not only required loy
statute and case law, see notes 141-48 infra and accompanying text, but is supported b\
the overwhelming weight of medical authority for therapeutic, emotional, financial, and
practical reasons, see Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the 1\,lentally Ill:
Practical Guides and Constitutional Imperati>es, 70
IcH. L. REv. 1107, 1194 n.385
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Chambers 1]. See also Chambers, Right to the Least Restrictive Alternative Setting for Treatment, in 2 MENTAL HEALI'Ht LAW PROJECT, PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, LEGAL RIGiTS OF THE . \IENTALLY HANDICA'IPED 991 (B.
Ennis & P. Friedman eds. 1973) [hereinafter citedt as Chambers II].
For general analysis of the effectiveness of different types of treatment settings see
H. BARTON, INSTITUTIONAL NEUROSIS (1959); D. CLARK, SOCIAL THERAPY IN
PSYCHIATRY (1974); E. GOFFSIAN, ASYLUMS (1961); JOINT INFORMATION SERVICE OF
THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC AsSS'N & THE NAT'L ASS'N FOR 5lFN'I'AL HEALTH,
REIABILITATING THE IENTALLY ILL IN THE COMMUNITY (1971); N. KITTRIE, THE
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means by which patients can achieve and demonstrate entitlement to

increased responsibility, less supervision, and, ultimately, release
from the institution. By foreclosing this opportunity to achieve and
demonstrate competence, the state has eliminated a major avenue by
which a patient may progress from more restricted to less restricted
environments. 131
The right to treatment in the least restrictive setting is based
upon the principle that although a government may be acting in
furtherance of a valid goal, "that purpose cannot be pursued by
means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end
can be more narrowly achieved." 13 2 This doctrine, known as the
"least restrictive alternative,' 3 3 requires that a court "ensure that the
state imposes no greater constriction of freedom than necessary to
4
serve [its] objectives. -13
At the very least, commitment to a psychiatric facility represents
a loss of freedoms which are customarily enjoyed by other citizens.
Thus, when a person is committed to a psychiatric hospital, his constitutionally protected rights to travel and to freely associate with
RIGHT To BE DIFFERENT

95-101 (1971);

LINN, supra note

112, at 463-92; A.

STANTON

& M. SCHWARTZ, THE MENTAL HOSPITAL (1954).

131It may even be implied that in some cases, therapeutic work programs represent
the only means whereby a patient may secure eventual release from the institution. Cf.
Richman & Zinn, supra note 114, at 607.
132 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (footnote omitted).
133 The doctrine is also known "as the principle of 'less drastic means' " and "as the
principle
of 'reasonable alternatives.' " Chambers I, supra note 130, at 1111 n.9.
134
Id. at 1111. The doctrine of the least restrictive alternative has been given a
liberal application, reaching areas of economic and commerce clause regulation as well
as personal rights and freedoms. Developments in the Law---Civil Commnitoient of the
Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1246 (1974). However, the nature of the right
invaded will dictate the degree to which a court will require that the challenged governmental action be the least restrictive alternative necessary to achieve its purpose.
Where, for example, a question of overreaching was framed in the context of state welfare regulation, the Supreme Court was quick to distinguish between measures taken
"in the social and economic field" and those which might infringe upon first amend-

ment rights or other basic freedoms guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, noting that stricter
standards would be applicable in the latter cases. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,
484-85 (1970). See also San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
32-37 (1973) (greater scrutiny required where regulation concerns a specific constitutional guarantee); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546-47 (1972) (measures in furtherance of social welfare held only to standard of rationality); Nioreno v. United States
Dep't of Agriculture, 345 F. Supp. 310, 313-14 (D.D.C. 192), aff'd, 413 U.S. 528 (1973)
(effect of statute determines degree of scrutiny).
When presented squarely in the setting of a civil commitment, due process requires
an affirmative showing "that the proposed commitment is to the least restrictive environment consistent with the needs of the person to be committed." Lynch v. Baxley,
386 F. Supp. 378, 392 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (footnote omitted).
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others 1 35 are curtailed, and his rights to peacefully assemble, 136
communicate, 13 7 practice religion, 138 and enjoy sexual privacy 139 are
similarly constricted. And, of course, he is in danger of losing "the
most basic and fundamental right [which] is the right to be free from
unwanted restraint."140
In view of this "massive curtailment of liberty, '" 14 1 federal courts
have not hesitated to test state commitment procedures against the
doctrine of "the least restrictive alternative," and in several cases
have required affirmative proof that no less restrictive alternative exists prior to authorizing commitment to a psychiatric institution.142
Thus, it is generally accepted that "committing courts and agencies
must refrain from ordering hospitalization whenever a less restrictive
alternative will serve as well or better the state's purposes. "143 This
principle also applies within the institutional context. In a recent decision it was held that confinement of a person in a psychiatric facility
may entail only
135 See, e.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 507, 517 (1964) (right to
travel closely associated with first amendment right of association); Kent v. Dulles, 357
U.S. 116, 125 (1958) (right to travel protected by due process).
136 See, e.g., De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364-65 (1937) (criminal syndicalism
statute declared unconstitutional insofar as it infringed the right to peaceful assembly);
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 551 (1875) (the right to peacefully assemble is
"one of the attributes of citizenship under a free government").
137 See, e.g., Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 306-07 (1965) (regulation
requiring seizure of "communist" literature by postal officials held violative of first
amendment); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633-34 (1943)
(right of communication extends to symbolic gestures).
138 See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404, 410 (1963) (state infringement of
freedom of religion improper even where indirect means are used); Mlurdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, i08 (i943) (license to solicit held utnccinstitutionl , when effect is
to inhibit practice of religion).
139 See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (right to sexual privacy
individual in nature); DeGregory v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 825, 829 (1966) (right to
privacy secured against intrusion by state); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
485-86 (1965) (state ban on use of contraceptive devices held an unconstitutional invasion of right to privacy).
140 Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1095-96 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated oil
other grounds and reoianded, 414 U.S. 473, modified on other grounds aod reinstated,
379 F. Supp. 1376 (1974), vacated on other grounds and remanded, 421 U.S. 957 (1975)
("full-time involuntary hospitalization only as a last resort").
141 Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972) (footnote omitted).
142See, e.g., Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Lake v. Camcron, 364 F.2d 657, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1966), Negron v. Preiser, 382 F. Stipp. 535, 542
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1095-96 (E.D. Wis. 1972), Vacated on other grounds and remanded, 414 U.S. 473, iodified on other grounds and
reinstated, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (1974), vacated on other grounds and remanded, 421 U.S.
957 (1975); In re Jones, 338 F. Stpp. 428, 429 (D.D.C. 1972).
143 Chambers I,supra note 130, at 1145.
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the minimum limitation of movement or activity of a patient or
resident necessary to provide reasonable assurance that his dangerousness would not constitute a significant risk to others and in
which treatment or habilitation continues to the fullest extent
possible. 144
In New Jersey, both the courts and the legislature have recognized this limitation on the state in light of the patient's right not to
have his liberty curtailed more than is necessary. In State v. Krol, the
New Jersey supreme court stated that commitment orders, while providing for the safety of the community, "should be molded . . . in a
fashion that reasonably minimizes infringements upon [a patient's]
liberty and autonomy.' ' 1 45 Furthermore, the revised New Jersey
court rules tacitly support the proposition that treatment be afforded
in the least restrictive setting by allowing "commitment to an appropriate institution" 14 and allowing release to "a non-residential mental health facility or other form of supervision.'1 47 Finally, in the 1975
revision of mental patients' rights, the New Jersey legislature explicitly included a patient's right "[t]o the least restrictive conditions necessaryto achieve the purposes of treatment. "148
When work programs are stopped, patients and residents lose
one of the major avenues for self-improvement and preparation for
eventual reentry into the community. Not only are they denied
practical employment experience, but in addition, are deprived of
income and funds which would otherwise enable them to participate
in various activities outside the institution. 149 The curtailment of
therapeutic work programs also eliminates one of the principal ways
in which patients can demonstrate to the hospital staff that they are
capable of adjusting to life outside the institution. The director of
New Jersey's Division of Mental Retardation has specifically noted
144

Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196, 1203 (N.D. Ohio 1974).

145 68 N.J. 236, 257, 344 A.2d 289, 300-01 (1975).

N.J.R. 4:74-7(f) (emphasis added).
N.J.R. 4:74-7(g).
148 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-24.2(e)(2) (Supp. 1976-77), amending N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 30:4-24.2 (Supp. 1975-76).
149 Programs for Patient-Workers: Approaches, Problems in Four Institutions, 27
HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 93, 97 (1976). For example, at one institution in
which the Souder decision led to paid vocational training, the salaries earned by patients
146
147

has made it possible to broaden their environment tremendously ....
Some
patients paid their own way to a YMCA summer camp, and some have made
trips to the Grand Old Opry in Nashville, to Six Flags Over Georgia in Atlanta,
and to the mountains and the shore. Some have bought three-wheeled bikes
that have greatly increased their mobility around the campus.
Id. at 95.
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that wage programs, while improving the morale of participants, are
"an addiparticularly significant in that they give the mildly retarded
50
tional opportunity to secure release from the facility.'
In the final analysis, elimination of work programs deprives patients of a meaningful opportunity to gain increased freedom and responsibility and to ultimately secure release from the institution. To
the extent that a patient's progress toward less restrictive environments or ultimate release is thereby diminished, the abrogation of
therapeutic work programs violates a patient's right to treatment in
the least restrictive setting.
WORK PROGRAMS AND THE RIGHT TO
FREEDOM FROM HARM

The termination of work programs in mental institutions poses a
genuine threat to the safety and well-being of resident inmates. In
addition to deterioration of physical conditions of hospital premises
through the loss of resident labor, 15 1 the elimination of work programs produces an adverse psychological and emotional effect upon
the patients themselves. A senior clinical psychologist in an institution for the mentally retarded has observed that, as a consequence of
work stoppage, many patients "have become more jittery, fighting to
continue 'working,' and having tantrums that included defecating, assaulting, and self-mutilating. "152 To the extent that termination of
work programs results in a dangerous and unhealthy atmosphere
-both physically and mentally-such termination violates the patients' constitutional right to freedom from harm.
hen a person

o

rnoifted

to either a penal or psychiatric in-

stitution, the state assumes a responsibility to protect such person
from harm.15 3 Those charged with the management of such facilities
150

Kott, supra note 114, at 188. See also Richman & Zinn, supra note 114, at 607.

An analysis of a formerly operative sheltered work program illustrates the significant
effect of therapeutic work programs, and reveals that 52 percent of the 441 participating
residents subsequently attained release from the institutions involved. Oudenne, supra
note 92, at 18.
151 See Bickford, supra note 92, at 714. Resident labor can include work in the
laundries, kitchens, and dining rooms, or on farms and dairies, as well as routine
maintenance and clean-up chores. Friedman I, supra note 2, at 568.
152 C. Cameron, Effects of the No Work Ruling on Hunterdon State School, Nov.
1, 1974 (unpublished memorandum on file at Seton Hall Law Re iew).
153 New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller,
357 F. Supp. 752,
764-65 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). The court explained that the constitutional right to freedom from harm could be founded upon either the eighth amendment concept of cruel
and unusual punishment, or the due process clause or the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Id. See generally Herr, supra note 128, at 750-54. For a general
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have a duty "to preserve [an inmate's] life, health, and safety-a duty
which is in addition to the duty of safekeeping owed to the public
generally."' 154 Custodial institutions must specifically protect inmates
from assaults, 15 5 provide them with medical care,' 5 6 allow them to
exercise and to have outdoor recreation, 157 provide sufficient heat for
their living quarters, and make available "the necessary elements of
basic hygiene."' 158 In short, state authorities must provide an envi59
ronment which meets "basic standards of human decency.'1
Whereas the standard applied in a penal setting has been described as "a tolerable living environment,' 6 0 it is obvious that a
higher standard should be applied wherever an inmate's commitment
is nonpenal in nature. 161 Clearly, a patient's confinement "must be
therapeutic, not punitive."1 62 Significantly, it has been noted that the
duty owed to a patient in a hospital specializing in the treatment of
mental disorders is greater than the duty owed to a patient in a gen63
eral hospital. 1
In addition to prohibitions on certain physical intrusions, psychological oppression and acts causing mental distress are similarly
within the proscription of the eighth amendment. The Second Circuit
recently noted:

discussion of the factual context of prison litigation in this area see J. MITFORD, KIND
AND USUAL PUNISHMENT 271-94 (Vintage Books ed. 1974).

154Roberts v. State, 307 N.E.2d 501, 505 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974).
1-1 Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 894 (N.D. Miss. 1972), aff'd, 501 F.2d 1291
(5th Cir. 1974). See Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1194 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Holt v.
Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 384 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
156See Corby v. Conboy, 457 F.2d 251, 254 (2d Cir. 1972); Martinez v. Mancusi, 443
F.2d 921, 924-25 (2d Cir. 1970).
157Cf. Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 133 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
158 New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752,
765 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). See also LaRean v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974, 978 (2d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973); cf. Campbell v. Beto, 460 F.2d 765, 768 (5th Cir.
1972).
159 Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 133 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
160 Kaufman, Book Review, 86 HARV. L. REv. 637, 639 (1973).

161 New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752,
764 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). See Rozecki v. Gaughan, 459 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1972) (cruelty more
cognizable in civil than in criminal setting); cf. Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183, 190
(5th Cir. 1971) (presumption of innocence prohibits punitive measures prior to conviction for criminal offense); Lollis v. New York State Dept. of Social Servs., 328 F. Supp.
1115, 1118 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), modifying 322 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (isolation of
juvenile not convicted of crime is cruel and unusual punishment); note 67 supra.
162 Kesselbrenner v. Anonymous, 33 N.Y.2d 161, 165, 305 N.E.2d 903, 905, 350
N.Y.S.2d 889, 892 (1973).
163See Fernandez v. Baruch, 96 N.J. Super. 125, 137, 232 A.2d 661, 667 (App. Div.
1967), rev'd on other grounds, 52 N.J. 127, 244 A.2d 109 (1968).
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Psychological oppression is as much to be condemned as physical
abuse, and . . . acts causing mental suffering can-even absent at16 4
tendant bodily pain-violate the Eighth Amendment.

Certainly, the harm that has befallen institutional residents including,
for example, lack of sensory motivation, lack of contact with the outside world, and inability to develop aspects of self-sufficiency, may
similarly come within this protection against psychological harm.
As a result of the discontinuance of work programs, residents are
placed in a living environment in which they are subject to precisely
the type of harm forbidden by case law. If patients are not allowed to
resume participation, the constitutional violations will continue.
WORK PROGRAMS AND LIBERTY AND PROPERTY
CONCEPTS: FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS

Among the constitutional attacks that may be levied against the
termination of voluntary, compensated, therapeutic work programs is
that such termination violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Essentially, the equal protection clause mandates
that before a state may limit or abrogate the rights of a class of individuals, the state's interest must be legitimate, and the classification
as well as the limitation must be rationally related to the legitimate
state interest.165 From two initial perspectives, it is clear that the
1'4 United States ex rel. Schuster v. Vincent, 524 F.2d 153, 160 (2d Cir. 1975). See
also LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974, 978 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878
(1973) (indecent conditions in strip cell "seriously threatened [plaintiff's] physical and
mental soundness"). For a full analytical discussion of the psychological harm which
can befall long-term prisoners see S. COHEN &t L. TAYLOR, PSYCHOOGCAL SURVTVAT.
(Vintage Books ed. 1974).
165 Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172 (1972). In F. S. Royster
Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920), the Court formulated an equal protection
test:
[T]he classification must he reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.
Id. at 415.
Generally, the Court, in employing this rational basis test, has given wide deference to the rationality of the state action in question. For example, in McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), the Court upheld the constitutionality of "Sunday Blue
Laws" against a challenge to the rationality of the classification of items forbidden to be
sold on Sunday. Id. at 425-28. The Court concluded that the classifications were rational, stating that "[t]he constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification
rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective." Id. at
425.
Gradually, the Court developed a second "tier" of scrutiny to be applied when
fundamental rights such as voting, see Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), have
been infringed or when the classification of individuals, such as by race, is deemed
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abrogation of work programs violates equal protection. First, while
the state has a legitimate interest in confining one who needs institutional treatment and who poses a threat to himself or others, 166 it is
clear that the justification for confinement is treatment calculated to
improve his condition. 16 7 When termination of work programs renders the therapeutic value of confinement ineffective, the concept of
treatment as justification becomes illusory, and the state's detention
of the class violates equal protection.' 68 Second, for the institutional
resident, therapeutic work programs afford the only opportunities to
work, to earn income, and to receive work-related benefits such as
social security. Whether the right to work is termed fundamental 6 9
suspect, see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). To pass constitutional muster the
state must show that (1) the statute, regulation, or practice is required, (2) the statute,
regulation, or practice advances a compelling interest, and (3) the state interest is legitimate. See generally Developments in the Lai--Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV.
1065 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Develop ients-Equal Protection]; Note, The Less Restrictive Alternative in Constitutional Adjudication: An Analysis, a Justification, and
Some Criteria, 27 VAND. L. REV. 971, 995-1011 (1974).
166 See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 736-38 (1972).
167 See notes 26-56 supra and accompanying text.
168This would hold true under a rational basis or strict scrutiny analysis because
the state's interests in and justifications for confinement are not furthered when treatment is ineffective. See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172-76
(1972) (state statute disabling illegitimate children from suing for workmen's compensation for death of father held violative of equal protection because a denial of benefits to
such children is unrelated to state interest in legitimate family relationships); F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 412-13, 416-17 (1920) (state's taxation of doiestic corporations on out-of-state profits while not imposing such tax on domestic
corporations not doing business in state held to violate equal protection because taxing
scheme unrelated to state purpose).
169 "Fundamental" interests are those deemed by the Court to warrant a higher degree of constitutional protection with the result that a strict scrutiny-compelling state
interest approach generally will be employed in judging the constitutionality of the
state's infringement. Rights which have been deemed fundamental include the right to
travel, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); the right to vote, see Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); the right to run for office, see Bullock v. Carter, 405
U.S. 134 (1972); the right to procreate, see Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942);
and the right to appellate review in criminal proceedings, see Griffin v. Illinois, 3.51
U.S. 12, 20 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
The Constitution does not expressly denominate rights as fundamental; rather, the
Court labels rights fundamental "upon a belief that they are simply more important than
others." Developments--Equal Protection, supra note 165, at 1128 (footnote omitted).
See also Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evoleing
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Nvewer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 8 & n.32 (1972). But see San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 31 (1973).
The right to pursue a livelihood has traditionally been accorded a heightened status
although it has not yet been denominated as "'fundanental" in the special constitutional
sense of the two-tiered equal protection test. For example, in Dent v. West Virginia, 129
U.S. 114 (1889), the Supreme Court upheld a state statute requiring certification of qualifications to practice medicine. Although the Court upheld the statute in the face of a
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or simply "important," a state may not limit or terminate work pro-

grams without demonstrating a compelling or, at a minimum, a
due process challenge, it did so on the basis that the state interest in regulating the
practice of medicine was important and that the certification procedures were reasonably related to the state's purposes. 1d. at 124-25, 128. The Court clearly indicated the
preferred status of the right to pursue a livelihood, stating that there exists
the right of every citizen of the United States to follow any lawful calling, business, or profession he may choose, subject only to such restrictions as are imposed upon all persons of like age, sex and condition. . .. [T]he right to continue their prosecution, is often of great value to the possessors, and cannot be
arbitrarily taken from them ....
Id. at 121.
Similarly, in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932), the Court confronted an ordinance which required the licensing of "the manufacture, sale and distribution of ice [as] a public business." To obtain a license, the potential businessman
had to demonstrate a community need for the product or service beyond that which
could be supplied by already existing businesses. Id. at 271-72. Finding no state interest supporting the statute, the Court affirmed a denial of an injunction against the
unlicensed ice manufacturer. Id. at 279-80. The Court had concluded that no regulation
which unreasonably abrogated or limited the right to engage in a lawful business pursuit could survive fourteenth amendment scrutiny, stating that
nothing is more clearly settled than that it is beyond the power of a state,
"under the guise of protecting the public, arbitrarily [to] interfere with private
business or prohibit lawful occupations or impose unreasonable and unnecessary restrictions upon them."
Id. at 278 (quoting from Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 513 (1924)) (emphasis added). See also Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 111-12 (1928)
("The police power may be exerted . . . only when such legislation bears a real and
substantial relation to ... some . . . phase of the general welfare"); Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356, 357-59, 373-74 (1886) (San Francisco regulations impairing or totally
eliminating operation of laundries violated equal protection when enforced only against
Chinese nationals); Corey v. City of Dallas, 352 F. Supp. 977, 980-81 (N.D. Tex. 1972)
(ban on adiuiiuitiatioi, of massagc:' to persons of opposite sex violates fourteenth
amendment right to earn a livelihood, the infringement of which requires justification by a compelling state interest). For additional cases holding that the right to earn a
livelihood or to engage in a business of one's choice is protected by both federal and
state constitutions see Smith v. Texas, 233 U.S. 630, 636 (1914); United States v. Briggs,
514 F.2d 794, 798 (5th Cir. 1975); Van Zandt v. McKee, 202 F.2d 490, 491 (5th Cir.
1953); Bautista v. Jones, 25 Cal. 2d 746, 749, 155 P.2d 343, 345 (1944); Lane Distribs. v.
Tilton, 7 N.J. 349, 362, 81 A.2d 786, 792 (1951); Cameron v. Theatrical Stage Employes
Local 384, 118 N.J. Eq. 11, 21-23, 176 A. 692, 697-98 (Ct. Err. & App. 1935); Carroll v.
Local 269, IBEW, 133 N.J. Eq. 144, 146, 31 A.2d 223, 224-25 (Ch. 1943). Cf. Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (conviction for teaching German violated plaintiff's
right to teach).
Residents of institutions do not lose rights merely because they are confined. In
Romero v. Schauer, 386 F. Supp. 851, 855 (D. Colo. 1974), the court stated:
Just as the inmates of a prison do not forfeit all constitutional rights upon commitment, neither do the patients at the Colorado State Hospital, although those
rights retained may be somewhat restricted by the nature of the institutional
environment.
See also Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196, 1206 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (enumerating
certain basic rights which residents retain while institutionalized, including the rights
"to manage [personal] affairs, to contract, [and] to hold professional and occupational or
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substantial state interest.170

Regardless of the scrutiny a court may employ in evaluating the
constitutionality of terminating therapeutic work programs, equal protection is nevertheless violated, because, by banning all work programs, the state has infringed more rights than necessary. The doctrine of the least restrictive alternative, applicable within an equal
protection analysis, mandates that infringement of individual interests
and liberties go no further than that which is absolutely necessary for
vehicle operators licenses"). By recognizing a resident's continuing right to hold occupational or professional licenses, the Davis court implicitly acknowledged that, despite
commitment, the right to earn a livelihood remains protected. In 1975, the New Jersey
legislature enacted a provision stating specifically that
no patient shall be deprived of any civil right solely by reason of his receiving
treatment . . . nor shall such treatment modify or vary any legal or civil right of
any such patient including . . . rights relating to the granting, forfeiture, or
denial of a license, permit, privilege, or benefit pursuant to any law.
Law of May 7, 1975, ch. 85, § 2, [1975] N.J. SESS. L. SERv. 141.
Even in the context of prisons, courts have traditionally recognized that inmates do
not forfeit their basic constitutional rights when imprisoned. As stated by the court in
Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944): "A prisoner retains all the rights
of an ordinary citizen except those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from
him." Accord, Negron v. Preiser, 382 F. Supp. 535, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Washington v.
Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327, 331 (M.D. Ala. 1966). Clearly, the rights of mental patients
warrant at least as much constitutional protection as is afforded to convicted criminals.
170 A number of commentators have suggested that several Supreme Court Justices
are dissatisfied with the definitional strictures of the two-tiered equal protection
analysis because the constitutional result is dependent upon the classification of the
right or interest as fundamental or nonfundamental. More specifically, under the twotiered approach, the Court, when faced with a serious infringement of an important
interest, is forced to either expand the category of fundamental rights and perhaps establish an unsatisfactory precedent or classify the right as nonfundamental and thereby
relegate an important interest to a rational basis analysis which is essentially insensitive
to its seriousness. See Gunther, supra note 169, at 8-20; Comment, Fundamental Personal Rights: Another Approach to Equal Protection, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 807, 808-09
(1973); Note, supra note 165, at 1006-07.
Several commentators who have noted the erosion of the two-tier equal protection
analysis propose alternative approaches. Professor Gunther suggests that the Court is
moving towards a "means-focused" model of equal protection scrutiny in which a court
would require that "the legislative means must substantially further legislative ends"
which "have substantial basis in actuality, not merely in conjecture." Gunther, supra
note 169, at 20-21. Further, where suspect classifications or fundamental interests are
involved, Professor Gunther would preserve the strict scrutiny approach. Id. at 21-24.
The author of a recent University of Chicago Comment to some extent agrees with
Professor Gunther's analysis of the direction of the Court. Comment, supra at 817-19.
However, the author argues for a fundamental rights approach, implying an expansion of
the category of fundamental rights for purposes of a balancing test. Here, the state's
goals in effecting the legislation would be balanced against the right which is being
infringed or abrogated. Id. at 827-31. Unlike Professor Gunther's proposal, the focus of
this approach would be directed to ends, not means.
A third approach is suggested by Professor Nowak, who indicates that the Court has
not moved in the direction forecast by Professor Gunther. The Nowak model advances
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the achievement of the state's interest. 1 7 1 Since the state's interest in
confinement is treatment coupled with security, the right to work,
especially in light of the demonstrated viability and success of
therapeutic work programs, must be preserved.
The justification offered for blanket termination of work programs
is lack of funds. 1 72 Although financial considerations may be a legitimate state interest, reliance on this "justification" for abridgment of
work programs is insufficient, whether these programs are deemed
an analysis focusing on the concept of "neutral classifications":
A classification is "neutral" whenever it treats persons in a dissimilar manner on the basis of some inherent human characteristic or status (other than
racial heritage), or limits the exercise of a fundamental right by a class of persons. Whenever legislation involves a neutral classification, the Court will validate it only if it has a factually demonstrable rational relationship to a legitimate state end. . . . [T]he Court should validate a statute only if the means used
bear a factually demonstrable relationship to a state interest capable of withstanding analysis. The Court will scrutinize the factual support for the legislation to determine whether its ends are capable of withstanding analysis and
whether its means are rationally related to that end.
Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee
-Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive Classifications, 62 GEo. L.J. 1071, 1093-94
(1974).
Thus, under the first two approaches, the state may not irrationally interfere with
the right to work regardless of whether or not it is termed a fundamental right. Under
the Nowak model, if the right to work were considered fundamental, arbitrary interference would similarly be held violative of equal protection. However, it is unclear
whether Professor Nowak would approve of the Court's inclusion of the right to treatment or the right to work into that very small group of rights now denominated as
fundamental.
Recent cases which suggest a movement away from the two-tiered approach are
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 641-46 (1973); United States Dept. ofA griculture v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533-38 (1973); Froiiec v. Richardson, 11! U.S. 677, 684,
691-92 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971). But see lemorial Hosp. v.
Maricopa Count%,, 415 U.S. 250, 258-59, 269 (1974) (compelling state interest required
where fundamental right to travel is infringed); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 339
(1972) (compelling state interest required where right to vote is infringed).
Commentators have also argued that the mentally handicapped should be regarded
as a suspect class and that any infringements on their rights should be viewed as a
violation of equal protection unless there is a compelling state interest furthered by the
classification. For example, in Case Comment, Wyatt v. Stickney and the Right of
Civilly Committed Mental Patients to Adequate Treatment, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1282,
1293-94 (1973), the author stated:
Since civil commitment trenches upon fundamental liberties and has invidious
effects upon the class of mentally ill, strict judicial review is appropriate and a
compelling state purpose should therefore be necessary to sustain the classifications.
(Footnotes omitted.) Chambers has suggested that "all regulation of the mentally handicapped as a class should . . . be regarded as constitutionally suspect and subjected to
close review." Chambers II, supra note 130, at 997-98.
171 See notes 130-34 supra and accompanying text.
i72 See notes 15 & 16 supra.
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constitutionally mandated as an integral part of treatment, or whether
they are viewed as protectable under "property" and "liberty"
concepts. 173 Courts have consistently held that lack of funds is no
excuse for a state's failure to provide adequate treatment in state
mental and rehabilitative institutions 1 74 or to provide tolerable living
environments in pretrial detention facilities or prisons.' 75 The "lack of
funds" rationale is similarly inadequate to justify deprivation of
therapeutic work programs which are generally essential to a healthful
physical and psychological environment and to successful treatment
and return to the community.
Termination of work programs thus violates equal protection because the erosion of the value of treatment caused by the elimination
of an essential treatment modality substantially diminishes the state's
justification for confinement. Absent justification, confinement is an
impermissible infringement of personal liberty. From a right-to-work
perspective, unjustified termination of work programs is similarly invalid.
ProceduralDue Process
Procedural due process requires a state to accord an individual
the right to notice and hearing before depriving him of a liberty or
173 See

note 176 infra.

174Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1314-15 (5th Cir. 1974); Welsch v. Likins, 373

F. Supp. 487, 499 (D. Minn. 1974). Despite the anticipation that heavy state expenditures would be involved, the Wyatt court held that the state could not fail to provide
adequate treatment in Alabama institutions for the mentally ill and mentally retarded
"for budgetary reasons alone," since without treatment there would be no justification
for confinement. 503 F.2d at 1315. In Welsch, the court went one step further, stating
that evidence of "substantial progress" and anticipation of continued improvement were
insufficient defenses if the level of treatment fell short of constitutional adequacy. 373
F. Supp. at 497-98. The court acknowledged the difficulties of entering "what is essentially a question of conflicting legislative priorities," but noted that "courts have on
occasion forced additional expenditures on State agencies to remedy constitutional violations." Id. at 498, 499. See also Rozecki v. Gaughan, 459 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1972) (lack
of heat in state correction and treatment center not justified by lack of funds).
175 See, e.g., Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 580 (8th Cir. 1968) (lack of funding
for alternate regulatory procedures does not justify "strapping" of prisoners since
'[h]unmane considerations and constitutional requirements are not ... to be measured or
limited by dollar considerations"); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 385 (E.D. Ark.
1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971) (obligation of state board of corrections to
eliminate unconstitutional conditions in prison not dependent on legislative action). For
cases involving pretrial detainees see Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333, 340-41 & n.19
(2d Cir. 1974) (institution ordered closed, but where this is not possible, a court may be
compelled "to order an expensive, burdensome or administratively inconvenient
remedy" to rectify unconstitutional conditions of confinement); Hamilton v. Love, 328
F. Stpp. 1182, 1194 (E.D. Ark. 1971) (lack of resources cannot justify lack of space,
recreation, plumbing facilities, and ventilation in facilities housing persons awaiting
trial and release will be mandated if necessary expenditures are not forthcoming).
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property right protected by the fourteenth amendment. When determining whether due process is required, courts employ a two-step
analysis: First, it is determined whether the right or interest at stake
is embraced within the meaning of the "liberty" or "property" language of the fourteenth amendment; 176 second, if the right is deemed
protected, the court balances the individual's "interest in avoiding
[a] loss" against "the governmental interest in summary adjudication"
in order to determine the degree of notice and hearing that is re-

quired. 177
Initially, it is apparent that due process protects therapeutic
work programs because such programs embody both property and
liberty interests. They constitute a property interest in that they are
the sole means by which an institutional resident may earn a livelihood, and a liberty interest in that they are vital to a resident's
psychological progress and to his development of marketable skills,
and thus are instrumental in returning him to society.
In addition, due process is applicable on the basis of the nexus
between therapeutic work programs and the right to treatment. Constitutionallv mandated treatment also embodies fourteenth amendment liberty interests because it is usually the only road out of the
institution. As any erosion of the quality of treatment prolongs con-

finement, it follows that a substantial dimunition of treatment -affects
176 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-71 (1972). A number of interests
have been held to come within the meaning of fourteenth amendment "liberty." See,
e.g., Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-58 (1974) (unjust physical restraint); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1972) (unjust physical restraint); Wisconsin v.
Constantineau. 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971) ("reputation, honor, or integrity"). The Court
has in recent years adhered to an earlier Court's definition of fourteenth amendment
"liberty" as
not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to
contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized . . .as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, supra
at 572.
Fourteenth amendment "property" interests include personal property, see Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342
(1969), as well as a variety of state-created benefits such as education, see Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572-76 (1975), drivers licenses, see Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535,
539 (1971), and welfare, see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970). For a
discussion of mental patients' right to procedural due process protection of their property interests see 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 624 (1975). See also Veccione v. Wohlgemuth,
377 F. Supp. 1361 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (statute permitting state seizure of mental patients'
assets without hearing or notice, to pay for care and maintenance held violative of due
process and equal protection clauses).
177 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970).
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fourteenth amendment liberty interests and thus may not be implemented without notice and hearing. 1 78 Since work therapy is inextricably bound to effective treatment, it is, in effect, a right adhering
within the broader right to treatment and imbued with the same con79
stitutional due process protections.1
Once it is established that these programs may not be terminated
without notice and hearing, it becomes necessary to balance the competing state and individual interests to determine what form of hearing is required. Here, the loss suffered by residents is substantial.
Termination effects a major change in the conditions of confinement,
eliminates a major form of therapy, delays release from the institution, and deprives residents of income and other work-related benefits. In short, the individual interests at stake are overwhelming.
On the other hand, the state interest in summary adjudication-a desire not to spend money or to complicate institutional administrative
processes--cannot outweigh the individual interests at stake.
Balancing these interests, it is apparent that the following procedures are required. First, prior to any determination regarding work
programs, the agency should hold public evidentiary hearings at
which all interested parties have the opportunity to testify and submit
data on the impact of work program termination.' 80 Second, prior to
178Courts have not been presented with issues involving institutionalized residents'

rights to notice and hearing prior to termination of treatment programs, primarily because (1) litigation has focused on forcing states to provide treatment in the first place,
see generally text accompanying notes 86-87 supra, and (2) virtually no patients have
had general access to counsel subsequent to commitment to state psychiatric institutions. But see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-24.2(g) (Supp. 1976-77); id. § 52:27E-21 et seq.
(Supp. 1975-76). However, at the very least, the liberty concept embodied in treatment
would warrant the same due process considerations given to a person's interest in
parole or probation.
179 See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972). Bullock concerned an equal protection challenge to a Texas filing fee requirement for candidates entering a state primary.
Id. at 135, 141. The Court noted that many potential candidates who had neither personal wealth nor wealthy supporters were, in effect, foreclosed from running for office,
and perceived a significant effect on voters resulting from a reduction in the number of
potential candidates, particularly those candidates who might represent the interests of
poorer communities. Id. at 143-44. Emphasizing the nexus between the right to vote
and "the resources of the voters supporting a particular candidate," the fee requirements were subjected to a strict scrutiny, id. at 144, and found violative of equal protection, id. at 149.
This case suggests that where the state seeks to eliminate an interest (therapeutic
work), which is essential to the integrity of a constitutional right (treatment), the due
process protections adhering to the right to treatment are, of necessity, applicable, and
subject to strict scrutiny, even if the interest in work may be termed nonfundamental.
180 Both the federal and the New Jersey Administrative Procedure Acts require
notice and hearing prior to agency rulemaking. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 52:14B-4(a) (Supp. 1975-76). It seems clear that the act terminating all work
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any actual termination, each resident must be given individual notice
and a hearing. 18 1 If a resident has been declared judicially incompetent or a bona fide doubt exists as to his competence, an independent
guardian ad litem should be appointed. 18 2 In view of the importance
of these programs to residents, the subsequent hearing must be an
adversary proceeding, accompanied by the full panoply of procedural
due process rights, including the right to counsel, to crossexamination, to presentation of witnesses, and to a neutral hearing

body. 183 Doubtless,

such

procedures

may appear to be time-

programs in state mental institutions is "rulemaking" within the meaning of the acts
since it is "an agency statement of general . . . applicability." 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1970).

See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52: 14B-2(e) (Supp. 1975-76). Both statutes describe the hearing required as the opportunity to present "data, views, or arguments" with or without
oral argument. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1970); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14B-4(a) (Supp. 1975-76).
In considering the type of hearing required, commentators generally agree that trialtype hearings are appropriate where the agency action involves questions of legislative
and adjudicatory facts and issues of law. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW TEXT

§ 7.05, at 165 (3d ed. 1972); Clagett, Informal Action-Adjudication-Rule Making:
Some Recent Deuelopmnents in Federal Administrative Law, 1971 DUKE L.J. 51, 85;
Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability: The Need fo r
Procedural Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1276, 1335
(1972). In light of the importance of work programs to the institutional environment and
to individual treatment programs, evidentiary hearings must be held prior to agency
action which would alter or abolish such programs. At these hearings, all interested
parties-patients, their guardians, their legal representatives, doctors, and hospital
administrators-would have the opportunity to present all relevant data and testimony,
to cross-examine witnesses, and, if necessary, to present expert testimony. Such hearings are essential to provide the information from which a reasoned decision regarding
work programs can be made, to provide an adequate record for judicial review, and to
ensure that those affected by the regulation will be afforded the necessary degree of
due process.
'll One court, relying on Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), has determined
that a hearing, with a neutral hearing officer, and the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses when appropriate, be afforded a patient in a mental institution before being
transferred. Jones v. Robinson, 440 F.2d 249, 250-52 (D.C. Cir. 1971). In language
which is appropriate to the question of termination of work programs as well, the court
noted that "due process is required in order to make as certain as the hospital authorities reasonably can the correctness of their decision." Id. at 251 (footnote omitted).
See also Broderick, A One-Legged Ombudsman in a Mental Hospital: An Over-theShoulder Glance at an Experimental Project, 22 CATH. U.L. REV. 517, 541-42 (1973).
182 See Dale v. Hahn, 440 F.2d 633, 638 (2d Cir. 1971). See also N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 30:4-24.2 (Supp. 1976-77).
193 The thrust of recent case law indicates that hearing procedures must be more
complex and adversary in character when the loss threatened is serious. For example, in
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), the state's interests in terminating parole
where conditions of parole had been violated or where subsequent crimes had been
committed was balanced against the parolee's interest in retaining his liberty. The
state's interests being great, the Court permitted the state to place the parolee in custody without a prior hearing. Id. at 483, 485. However, the Court also found the
parolee's interest to be substantial, mandating that a hearing be held shortly after arrest
to determine probable cause and that another hearing be held prior to final revocation
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consuming and costly. Nonetheless, they must be implemented because the rights at stake are so crucial and so clearly among the libof parole. Id. at 482, 484-89.
Since the first hearing was summary in nature, the Court only required that, in
addition to notice of the alleged parole violations, a parolee be allowed to appear in his
own behalf, and to have a conditional right of confrontation, an independent decisionmaker, and a written report of the proceeding. Id. at 485-87.
Since the second hearing resulted in a final decision, the Court required that the
parolee be accorded far more extensive rights:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the
parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to
present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds
good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a "neutral and detached" hearing
body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial
officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole.
Id. at 489. One of the points implicit in Morrissey was the difference between parole
revocation and denial. See id. at 482 & n.8. Since the potential loss of already-existing
liberty (albeit conditional) involved such a " 'grievous loss,' " due process required, at a
minimum, a full adjudicatory-type hearing prior to revocation. Id. at 482, 489. The Morrissey result may be compared with the situation in Beckworth v. New Jersey State
Parole Bd., 62 N.J. 348, 301 A.2d 727 (1973), where the court distinguished Morrissey
and found that the full panoply of due process rights did not attach to a parole release
hearing, in part due to the distinction between the deprivation of an already-existing
benefit and the denial of a potential future benefit. Id. at 362-66, 301 A.2d at 734-36.
Clearly, the termination of heretofore-existing work programs falls within the scope of
Morrissey, with the result that revocation of work programs must be accompanied by the
same procedural safeguards as those mandated for revocation of parole.
In Gagnon %. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), the Court held the Morrissey
procedures applicable to a revocation of probation. Id. at 786, 791. See also Avant v.
Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 525-32, 341 A.2d 629, 645-49 (1975) (Gagnon and Morrissey
principles applied to prison disciplinary procedures). The Gagnon Court declined to
mandate a right to counsel because "[i]n most cases, the probationer or parolee has
been convicted of committing another crime or has admitted the charges against him."
411 U.S. at 787 (footnote omitted). However, the Court adopted a case-by-case approach
to gauge when "fundamental fairness" would require the presence of counsel. Id. at
790.
Numerous courts have held that in proceedings where the liberty rights of mentally
ill or allegedly mentally ill individuals are jeopardized by commitment, there is a right
to counsel. See In re Barnard, 455 F.2d 1370, 1375-76 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Heryford v.
Parker, 396 F.2d 393, 396 (10th Cir. 1968); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078,
1097-98 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on other grounds and remanded, 414 U.S. 473, modified on other grounds and reinstated, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (1974), vacated on other
grounds and remanded, 421 U.S. 957 (1975); Dixon v. Attorney General, 325 F. Supp.
966, 974-75 (M.D. Pa. 1971); In re Fisher, 39 Ohio St. 2d 71, 313 N.E.2d 851, 858
(1974).
Recently, a New Jersey county court vacated an order which would have attached
all income over $25 of all patients at a county hospital for their care and maintenance,
and ordered that individual hearings be held to determine the financial ability of each
of 350 patients to contribute to their maintenance. Patients are to be represented by
counsel and given an opportunity to present evidence. Order Vacating Judgment & Defendants' Brief in Support of Motion, Board of Chosen Freeholders v. Connell, No.
83870 (Hudson County Ct., Dec. 2, 1975).
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erty and property interests which the fourteenth amendment was
meant to protect.
CONCLUSION

The outrages of "institutional peonage" led to the welcomed and
needed reforms highlighted by the Wyatt and Souder cases. Responses such as the one in New Jersey, however, may have succeeded in merely replacing one undesirable situation with another, a
result clearly not foreseen by the mental health law reform movement
at the time the question of litigation in this area first arose.
Because the question of the necessity for payment for work done
is now beyond dispute, attention can be turned to the affirmative
need for such programs, from both the therapeutic and constitutional
points of view. The action taken by those states which have abolished
all programs is clearly unconstitutional and may be ultimately seen
as a bad situation made worse. It is urged that a reinstitution of
therapeutic programs-solely on a paid, voluntary basis-would ameliorate conditions and offer residents a meaningful opportunity to receive treatment designed to give each committed person "a realistic
opportunity to be cured. "184
184 Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971), enforced, 344 F.
Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd sub non. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.
1974).

